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 At the turn of the fourteenth century, the character of political rule in the 
major cities of Flanders changed decisively. Around 1280, the manual work-
ers who during the thirteenth century had been systematically excluded 
from the city government, fi nally entered the political stage. Aft er the pop-
ular victory of 1302 the craft  guilds, especially in the larger urban centres of 
Bruges and Ghent , gained access to the arenas of political decision- making. 
Th e cities emerged with new constitutions in which control of the urban 
government was shared between the old merchant class and the guilds, 
which were now given new liberties, though the equilibrium between the 
two would always remain precarious. 1 Guild power became a prominent 
feature of social and political life, so much so that the late medieval period 
in Bruges can be justly termed the age of ‘corporatism’, with the city being 
regarded as a body politic strongly infl uenced by the ‘political guilds’. While 
this development partly emerged from longer- term economic change, the 
momentous events around 1300 altered the nature of communal politics. 
While corporatist ideas and practices of governing the urban body politic 
borrowed from an earlier communal ideology, aft er 1302 the craft  guilds 
would become, or would at least present themselves as, the embodiment 
of the urban commune. For centuries to come, the guilds would also be 
the main political bodies around which popular demands would mobi-
lize. Th eir sign languages and practices – their banners, slogans, meetings, 
armed gatherings and strikes – came to dominate the processes and course 
of popular politics. 2 
 Yet as ‘political guilds’, the Bruges craft s were also Janus- faced: they func-
tioned both as instruments of popular political participation or even rebel-
lion and also as tools of urban government, delegated with military, political 
and legal tasks. Th ey also developed their own internal elites, who were 
economically powerful and politically active, though they were connected 
 1  Th e best synthesis on the events and aft ermath of 1302, with references to older works, is Van 
Caenegem (ed.),  1302 . 
 2  M.  Boone , ‘ La construction d’un républicanisme urbain: Enjeux de la politique municipale dans 
les villes fl amandes au bas Moyen Âge ’, in  D.  Menjot and  J.- L.  Pinol (eds.),  Enjeux et expressions 
de la politique municipale (XIIe– XXe siècles) ( Paris ,  1997 ), pp.  41 – 60 . 
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still to other social groups. An examination of the city’s political history 
needs to consider the changing nature of Bruges society, and the diffi  culty 
of categorizing the social groups involved in political processes. Even so, 
one of the main underlying sources of tension, perhaps the major fault- line 
in Bruges society throughout the later Middle Ages, was between two main 
groups: the commercial elites (rentiers , merchants, bankers , brokers , hos-
tellers and the richer retailers, including butchers and fi shmongers ) on the 
one hand, and the producing classes and small shopkeepers from the local 
market (small entrepreneurs, middle- class guild masters and wage work-
ers), on the other. Th e commercial elite was constantly trying to restore its 
power and eliminate corporatist rule of the city. Yet while this main fault- 
line is oft en visible, it was complicated and obscured by other social and 
political networks and solidarities. A full picture of late medieval politics 
and society in Bruges has to take account of other alliances: between fam-
ilies, between textile workers and merchant factions siding against ruling 
regimes, or between the rich and their clients among poorer people. 3 
 From the Commune to the Corporatist Body 
Politic: Institutions and Administration 
 Th e institutional bases of guild authority were many. Essential to their fl ex-
ing of political power was their military muscle. In 1302, the Bruges city 
militia shown itself to princes and nobles as a force to be reckoned with, and 
by 1340 it counted more than 6,000 people, the majority of whom were arti-
sans. Th e division of each guild or section of the  poorterie in the militia, the 
 voud , was directed by a captain or  hooft man recruited from its own ranks, 
and artisans also took part in the shooting guilds of the longbowmen, later 
known as St Sebastian’s guild, and of the crossbowmen, eventually orga-
nized into two guilds of St George , the Oudhof (Old Court) and the Jonghof 
(Young Court). During the fourteenth century these shooting guilds became 
strongly associated with the urban government and urban identity, though 
the crossbowmen would always retain a more socially elitist profi le than the 
longbowmen. 4 By 1349, the craft  guilds had successfully lobbied to receive 
 3  Dumolyn, ‘Guild Politics’. 
 4  J. F.  Verbruggen , ‘ De Brugse eff ectieven van de slag bij Kortrijk ’,  Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis 
der Nederlanden ,  2 ( 1948 ), 241– 7 (at  242– 3 ) ; Verbruggen,  Het gemeenteleger van Brugge ;  J. F. 
 Verbruggen , ‘ De organisatie van de militie te Brugge in de XIVe eeuw ’,  HGG ,  87 ( 1950 ),  163– 
70 ; an example of the military expenses of a specifi c guild can be found in the accounts of the 
Bruges weavers 1372– 3: see Espinas and Pirenne (eds.),  Recueil , vol.  i , p. 589. 
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a salary during campaigns, the so- called ‘monthly money’ ( maendgheld ). 5 
Apart from the regular militia mobilized by the guilds and the merchants, a 
paramilitary group in the service of the town also developed, known as the 
Red Hoods (Rode Kaproenen), an elite corps of between 40 and 100 men 
led by a captain, the  upperhooft man . First mentioned around 1360, its sub-
sequent history suggests strong connections with guild aspirations, for it 
would be abolished aft er the 1436– 8 revolt and then re- established in 1477, 
both dates when guilds lost and reasserted their authority (see below). Th e 
city’s military organization was thus a mixture of corporatist and profes-
sional elements, the exception being the urban cavalry which was the pre-
serve of rich burghers who possessed their own horses and armour. Th e 
Flemish urban militias have sometimes been unfairly dismissed as ineffi  -
cient and ineff ective compared with professional armies. Th e militia was 
makeshift  in so far as many citizens kept arms at home, but it also had pro-
fessional artillery specialists to handle a considerable arsenal of heavy guns, 
and the guilds also stocked weapons in their guildhouses. 6 But the mili-
tia’s military capabilities were of less signifi cance than its political impor-
tance: its military strength primarily served to bolster urban autonomy and 
to add political weight to artisans within the body politic. 
 Capitalizing on their power aft er 1302, the Flemish artisans forced their 
allies of the comital family to grant privileges to their guilds and cities. 
Th ese charters made concessions to many popular demands that had been 
voiced from the fi rst major wave of Flemish revolts in 1275– 80 . In 1302, 
having exiled their adversaries of the pro- French Lily party to which the 
majority of the merchant class belonged, the popular alliance of artisans 
and entrepreneurs – who were then still known as the  amici comitis or  par-
tie li conte (‘friends’ or ‘party’ of the count) – occupied approximately 75 
per cent of governmental offi  ces in Bruges. Aft er 1304 this number began 
to decrease and a new balance was sought between the diff erent social 
groups. 7 On 4 November 1304, Philip of Chieti , a son of Count Guy de 
Dampierre (the latter still held prisoner by the French king) granted Bruges 
a new charter of privileges. Like its predecessors of 1165– 77 and 1281, this 
 5  GVS,  Inventaire , vol.  iv , p. 180. 
 6  Van Houtte,  De geschiedenis van Brugge , pp. 327– 32; De Smet, ‘De inrichting’;  P.  Stabel , 
‘ Militaire organisatie, bewapening en wapenbezit in het laatmiddeleeuwse Brugge ’,  BTFG ,  89 
( 2011 ),  1049– 73 ;  J.  Haemers and  B.  Verbist , ‘ Het Gentse gemeenteleger in het laatste kwart 
van de vijft iende eeuw: Een politieke, fi nanciële en militaire analyse van stadsmilities ’,  HMG , 
 62 ( 2008 ),  291 – 326 ;  F.  Buylaert and  B.  Verwerft  , ‘ Urban Militias, Nobles and Mercenaries: Th e 
Organisation of the Antwerp Army in the Flemish- Brabantine Revolt of the 1480s ’,  Journal of 
Medieval Military History ,  9 ( 2011 ),  146– 66 . 
 7  J. F.  Verbruggen , ‘ Beschouwingen over 1302 ’,  HGG ,  93 ( 1956 ), 38– 53 (at  43 ). 
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‘urban constitution’ mostly covered matters dealing with criminal and pri-
vate law , and with procedures for the administration of justice. However, 
testifying to an increased degree of urban autonomy, new stipulations set 
out how relations between the city and the count and his offi  cers were to 
be run, and how the city government was to be elected. Th e textual tradi-
tion of the 1304 privilege is confusing. Th e document exists in diff erent 
versions. Only the copies from the ‘urban point of view’, and not from the 
‘comital’, explicitly describe how the city government was to be elected. 
Every year on 2 February (Candlemas ), thirteen aldermen ( scepenen ) and 
thirteen councillors ( raeden ) were to be appointed. Signifi cantly, the craft  
guilds had the right to appoint nine of the thirteen aldermen and council-
lors while the four other ones were to be appointed by the count from the 
ranks of the  poorters (burghers). Th e term  poorter had been used to denote 
anyone with burgher rights, but now it was also used more narrowly to 
refer to merchant families, other property owners and rich burghers. Th e 
 poorterie , a group that now formed a separate institution and in eff ect the 
legal successor to the former merchant Hanse, would continue to operate as 
a political counterweight to the guilds in Bruges. Following the election of 
the aldermen and councillors, the aldermen were to choose a burgomaster 
( burchmeestere van scepenen ) from their ranks, and subsequently the alder-
men and councillors together would elect the burgomaster of the council , 
also called the burgomaster ‘of the body’ ( burghemeester van den courpse ) 
or ‘of the commune’ ( van den commune ). Another type of city offi  cials, the 
treasurers , already introduced as distinct offi  cers in 1297– 8, reported on 
urban fi nances. Th eir number was eventually settled at two for each yearly 
jurisdiction. 8 
 Institutionally, the city government and the administration of justice 
were closely intertwined. Many of the councils, commissions and boards 
in Bruges exercised both administrative and judicial powers. Elected or 
appointed politicians normally served no more than one consecutive year 
on a particular council, although they could be – and were oft en – re- elected 
aft er a compulsory one- year lapse. Th ey were assisted by professional city 
clerks , who built their career in the city administration and who guaranteed 
 8  G.  De Poerck , ‘ Note critique sur le grand privilège brugeois de 1304 et le règlement d’élection 
du magistrat ’,  HGG ,  74 ( 1931 ),  139– 57 ; GVS,  Coutume , vol.  i , pp. 286– 307, 316;  D.  Berten , ‘ Un 
ancien manuscrit fl amand de la bibliothèque de Vienne ’,  Bulletin de la Commission Royale pour 
la Publication des Anciennes Lois et Ordonnances de Belgique ,  9 ( 1913 ),  443– 4 , is the version 
stating that nine aldermen and councillors would be elected by the  ambochters (guildsmen); 
and see the critical refl ections on this textual tradition in Van den Auweele, ‘Schepenbank’, 
pp. 159– 61; and  D.  Van den Auweele , ‘ Varia juridica ex manuscriptis: Bronnen van het oude 
Brugse recht ’,  Standen en Landen. Nieuwsbrief ,  2 ( 1992 ),  6 – 19 . 
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its continuity. Th e council of aldermen ( den ghemeenen college van scep-
enen ) – in historiography commonly referred to as the ‘bench’ of aldermen 
although this term never occurs in a medieval source – acted both as the 
supreme council for the daily political administration of the city and as the 
highest court of law in criminal matters, including both penal and recon-
ciliation justice , and in civil matters, including contentious and voluntary 
justice. Acts of private law , such as inheritances, sales and other contracts 
were sealed by the aldermen (for although notaries existed in Bruges and 
Flanders, they were less prominent than in Italy ). It was the urban court 
that acted as a warrantor for property rights and business contracts, includ-
ing those involving foreign merchants. In spite of contemporary references 
to the council as ‘the aldermen’ or ‘the common council of aldermen’, the 
city government was composed not only of twelve aldermen, but also of 
twelve councillors ( raeden ), each with a burgomaster . Hence, the city coun-
cil’s full title, oft en used in its sentences and deeds, was ‘the council of bur-
gomasters, aldermen and councillors’. 9 
 Th e precise competencies of the ‘councillors’, who in origin may have 
emerged from older communal institutions (see  Chapter 4 ), still need fur-
ther investigation. Contrary to a persistent myth in Bruges historiography, 
the councillors did not constitute a second ‘bench’ of magistrates separate 
from the aldermen (as was the case in Ghent , where the aldermen of the 
 keure and those of  gedele constituted two benches, each with its own organi-
zation and even assembly hall). 10 Th e collective name for the councillors in 
contemporary sources was indeed ‘council’ ( raed ), but this is not the same 
as ‘ the council’. In fact the councillors acted as assessors in the council of 
aldermen and in its commissions and deputations, but they had a lesser role 
as their votes were not taken into account when reaching a verdict or estab-
lishing a quorum. In contrast to the aldermen, the councillors did not take 
part in the judgment of criminal cases, but in civil cases only. Moreover, the 
burgomaster of the council , apart from also imposing arbitration and rec-
onciliatory justice on confl icting parties, acted as public prosecutor defend-
ing the interests of the commune. 11 However, certain executive powers 
  9  Dutch: ‘Wij buerchmeesters, scepenen ende raed van de stede van Brugghe’ (SAB, 157, no. 3, 
reg. 1447– 53, fo. 55 v  – 29 August 1448); French: ‘Bourgmaistres, eschevins et conseil de la ville 
de Bruges’ (SAB, 157, no. 3, reg. 1447– 53, fo. 24 r  – 27 January 1448 n.s.); Latin: ‘Burgimagistri, 
scabini et consules ville Brugensis’ (SAB, 164, reg. 1439– 41, fo. 44 – 4 March 1440 n.s.). 
 10  For the institutions of Ghent, see  M.  Boone ,  Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen ca. 1384 – ca. 
1453: Een sociaal- politieke studie van een staatsvormingsproces ( Brussels ,  1990 ); and numerous 
other publications by the same author. 
 11  See above,  Chapter 4 . A useful source for the urban institutions remains the treatise by the 
Bruges jurist Joos de Damhouder,  Van de grootdadigheyt der breedt- vermaerde regeringhe van 
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remained in the hands of the count. Another prosecutor was the ‘sheriff ’ 
( schout ,  scouteete, escoutete or  scultetus ). Th e sheriff  was directly appointed 
by the prince and was not to be a burgher of the town. He upheld public 
peace, the rule of law and the interests of the count. He was lodged at the 
 Love on the Burg square and had his own police force of twelve sergeants 
(’ s heren cnaepen ). Th e sheriff  summoned perpetrators of crimes and other 
transgressors of the law before the aldermen. 12 
 Th e council of aldermen generally assembled every morning, except on 
Sundays, in their chamber in the aldermen’s hall ( scepenen huus ), in the 
Burg square . During the assemblies, behind closed doors, the aldermen, 
oft en jointly with the councillors, dealt with matters of city government 
and with judicial cases that were brought to them. Unlike the legal pro-
ceedings and verdicts, of which records were kept as early as 1361 (no reg-
isters of the chamber survive from before 1423 and those preserved cover 
only thirty years of the fi ft eenth century), the political discussions by their 
council were for a long time kept secret from the outside world. 13 Th ey pre-
sumably also remained unrecorded, as the registers of the resolutions of 
the aldermen only start in 1535 and no reference is made to them before 
that date. 14 Hence, little is known about political decision- making by the 
city government, beyond that it was to be kept secret by those participating 
(observing the so- called  secreet van scepenen or ‘secret of the aldermen’) 
and that there was an established order in which the council members were 
allowed to voice their opinion (fi rst came the aldermen, then the senior 
clerks and fi nally the councillors). Prior to 1491, except for some decisions 
copied into the city’s cartularies of privileges, there are no surviving records 
of the council’s political decisions, the  hallegeboden , which were made pub-
lic in proclamations at the Belfry . 15 
 By 1304, the main apparatus of urban administration was established, 
although in line with many towns, it grew in size and became further pro-
fessionalized during the fourteenth and fi ft eenth centuries. Th e policemen 
de stadt Brugge ( Amsterdam ,  1684 ), pp.  484 ,  491 ,  503 , which is the Dutch translation of his 
original  De magnifi centia politae amplissimae civitatis Brugensis (Antwerp, 1564). 
 12  Th e development of the princely judicial offi  cers in Bruges and Flanders, from  burggraaf 
(castellan) to  baljuw (bailiff ) and, particularly in the case of Bruges, the  schout (sheriff ) may be 
traced in Ganshof,  Recherches sur les tribunaux ; Nowé,  Les baillis ;  J.  Van Rompaey ,  Het grafelijk 
baljuwsambt in Vlaanderen tijdens de Boergondische periode ( Brussels ,  1967 ); and see above, 
 Chapter 4 . 
 13  SAB, 157, 164, 165 and 166 contain registers of the chamber dating from the fi ft eenth century 
(but no earlier than 1423), that have sometimes been mixed up with registers of the  vierscare 
(as is the case with series 157). 
 14  SAB, 118. 
 15  SAB, 120 (injunctions issued at the halle of  Hallegeboden ) starts in January 1491. 
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in the service of the city (the  scarwetters ) had their headquarters in the 
Groenevoorde house at the market - place and were charged with uphold-
ing public order and protecting the members of the town government. 
Apart from its political members, who were annually renewed (from 1241 
onwards, as we have seen), the urban administration was also composed 
of a varying number of salaried clerks , who advised on city governance 
and in trials, and who registered the council’s political and legal proceed-
ings:  they formed the most stable and professional element within the 
administration. Th ere were four to eight ‘senior clerks’ ( upperclercken ) in 
the fourteenth century, rising to thirteen in the busiest years of the fi ft eenth 
century, and stabilizing at around ten in the sixteenth. Th ey included the 
 pencionarissen or  clercken pencionarissen , who acted as senior political and 
legal advisors to the aldermen and who were oft en legally, or at least aca-
demically, trained, as indicated by their university title of master ( meester ). 
(Confusingly, the term  pencionarissen (van der stede) could be used to refer 
to all city personnel who were on the city’s payroll.) Th e  clerck pencionaris 
who was fi rst in rank had no specifi c function title before the sixteenth 
century, when he was called the ‘(fi rst) secretary’ ( secretaris or  eerste sec-
retaris ) or the fi rst  pencionnaris . Besides the senior advisors, who had no 
specifi c responsibilities, the category of city clerks also included the  greffi  ers 
or  clercken who acted as the registrar or administrative head of one of the 
aldermen’s offi  ces ( greffi  es ) or commissions. Th ey comprised – in order of 
importance – the registrar of the (aldermen’s) chamber, later known as the 
civil registrar ( greffi  er civil ); the registrar of the  vierscare , in the fi ft eenth 
century also called the clerk of the blood ( clerc van den bloede ) or sim-
ply the registrar ( greffi  er ), and in the sixteenth century the registrar of the 
blood ( greffi  er van den bloede ) or the criminal registrar ( greffi  er criminel ); 
his  onder greffi  er ; the clerk of the treasury ( clerc van der tresorie ); his  onder 
clerc , who acted also as the collector of the heritable rents; and the clerk 
of the orphans’ chamber ( clerc van den wesen ). Moreover,  taelmannen or 
lawyers served the city to defend its interests in princely and ecclesiastical 
courts. From the end of the thirteenth century there was also an offi  cial 
city surgeon , and engineers ( engienmeesters ) responsible for the locks and 
water infrastructure. Th e  mudderaers were of much lower rank, responsible 
for cleaning the streets and canals. Th e city employed many messengers, 
and twelve trial servers who also served as bodyguards for the magistrates 
( stede garsoenen ). Other offi  cial urban offi  ces included cloth measurers, 
wine carriers and other types of porter, profi table offi  ces which were oft en 
leased to a limited number of people. Th e urban prison (the Steen), was 
run by a warder ( steenwaerder ). By the end of the fourteenth century, the 
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city administration comprised some fi ft y paid offi  cials in total, a consider-
able number. Other urban offi  ces, oft en with lucrative incomes attached to 
them, were farmed out to private investors, as was the collection of excises 
on consumption products in most years. 16 
 Th e precise control that guildsmen exercised over the urban government 
is not easy to document; and in the early fourteenth century it was not even 
certain that guild dominance would prevail, still less that the earlier com-
munal model of mass assemblies, in which every sworn member of the 
commune had been able to participate, would be replaced by a guild sys-
tem of popular participation. Th is system had to be gradually worked out 
and the artisans’ impact on Bruges’ institutions would continue to depend 
on the particular socio- political balance of forces in any given period. 17 
Th e Moerlemaye Revolt of 1280– 1 tried in vain to revive the memory of 
the old communal assemblies, and by 1302 it had become clear that the 
guilds, asserting a greater military and economic power, were in the best 
position institutionally to represent the mass of the urban population. Even 
 16  SAB, 216 (city accounts): yearly entries of expenditure for salaries; GVS,  Coutume , vol.  i , 
pp. 286– 323; Van Houtte,  De geschiedenis van Brugge , pp. 319– 44. On the urban prison, 
see B. Beernaert, ‘Het Steen: Een benadering van de vroegere Brugse gevangenis’, in  Van 
Middeleeuwen tot heden , pp. 20– 8. On various urban offi  cers, see the works of  A.  Vandewalle , 
‘ De stadsoffi  ciën van Brugge: Openbaar ambt of commercie (15 e – 18 e eeuw) ’, in  G.  Macours 
(ed.),  Cornua legum: Actes des journées internationales d’histoire du droit et des institutions 
1986 ( Antwerp ,  1987 ), pp.  217– 25 ;  A.  Vandewalle , ‘ De stedegarsoenen, boden in dienst van de 
magistraat in de Nieuwe Tijd ’, in  G.  Asaert (ed.),  Recht en instellingen in de oude Nederlanden 
tijdens de Middeleeuwen en de Nieuwe Tijd. Liber Amicorum Jan Buntinx ( Leuven ,  1981 ), pp. 
 391 – 404 . On the aldermen, see  J.  Mertens , ‘ Bestuursinstellingen van de stad Brugge (1127– 
1795) ’, in  W.  Prevenier and  B.  Augustyn (eds.),  De gewestelijke en lokale overheidsinstellingen 
in Vlaanderen tot 1795 ( Brussels ,  1997 ), pp. 323– 32 (at p.  327 ) ;  J.  van Leeuwen ,  De Vlaamse 
wetsvernieuwing: Een onderzoek naar de jaarlijkse keuze en aanstelling van het stadsbestuur in 
Gent, Brugge en Ieper in de Middeleeuwen ( Brussels ,  2004 ) , passim. On clerks and messengers, 
see H. Dendooven, ‘De Brugse klerken in de veertiende eeuw’, unpublished MA thesis, Ghent 
University (Ghent, 2007);  H.  Lowagie ,  Met brieven an de wet: stedelijk briefverkeer in het 
laatmiddeleeuwse graafschap Vlaanderen ( Ghent ,  2012 ) , passim. 
 17  J.  Mertens , ‘ De verdeling van de Brugse schepenzetels op sociaal gebied (XIVde eeuw) ’, 
 Wetenschappelijke tijdingen ,  21 ( 1961 ), cols.  451– 66 ;  J.  Mertens , ‘ Brugge en Gent: De 
vertegenwoordiging van de “leden” in de stadmagistraat ’, in  J.  Dezutter ,  L.  Charles and  A. 
 Capiteyn (eds.),  Qui Valet Ingenio, Liber Amicorum Dr. Johan Decavele ( Ghent ,  1996 ), pp.  385– 
91 ;  Van den Auweele , ‘Schepenbank’, passim; A. Vandewalle,  ‘De Brugse stadsmagistraat en de 
deelname van de ambachten aan het bestuur, 14 de – 15 e eeuw ’, in  W.  Prevenier and  B.  Augustyn 
(eds.),  De Vlaamse instellingen tijdens het Ancien Régime: Recent onderzoek in nieuw perspectief 
( Brussels ,  1999 ), pp.  27 – 40 ; Dumolyn,  De Brugse opstand , pp. 105– 20; Vanhaverbeke, ‘Het 
stadsbestuur in Brugge in de periode 1375– 1407: Sociaal- institutionele benadering aan de 
hand van een prosopografi sche methode’, unpublished MA thesis, Catholic University of 
Leuven (Leuven, 1997); Vanhaverbeke, ‘Het stadsbestuur in Brugge’;  A.  Janssens , ‘ Macht en 
onmacht van de Brugse schepenbank in de periode 1477– 1490 ’, in  HGG ,  133 ( 1996 ),  5 – 45 ; 
Haemers,  For the Common Good , passim. 
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so, the charters granted to Bruges and other cities in Flanders between 1301 
and 1304 referred to liberties granted to ‘the commune’ and ‘common-
ers’ ( ghemeentucht ,  ghemeente ,  ghemeen or  li commun ) rather than explic-
itly to ‘guilds’. However, shortly aft er, Bruges charters began to name the 
guilds as the groups with the exclusive right to represent the commoners . 18 
Other institutional experiments in these early years also seem designed to 
frame the increased political infl uence of a larger portion of the popula-
tion. Shortly aft er 1302, the Bruges guildsmen took control of an institu-
tion known as the ‘hundredmen’ ( hondertmannen ). On 25 April 1303, these 
hundredmen were appointed as justices of the peace ( paisieres ), to mediate 
in confl icts and feuds between citizens. Earlier in that year they had already 
been checking the city accounts, a long- standing popular demand to pre-
vent fraud and corruption by the ruling oligarchs, replacing the ephemeral 
‘twentymen’ whom the king of France had installed during French occu-
pation. However, the competences of the hundredmen were also short- 
lived and they were ultimately replaced by the colleges of the ‘partitioners’ 
( deelmannen ) and of the ‘headmen’ ( hooft mannen ). Th e ‘hundredmen’ are 
not mentioned aft er 1337– 8. Th e college of  deelmannen was given a formal 
structure in 1305 and by 1311 they seem to have gradually replaced the 
‘hundredmen’ in most of their responsibilities. Initially, there were three 
to seven  deelmannen per section ( zestendeel ) but their number ultimately 
settled at six, each led by a dean . Th ey were appointed by the aldermen and 
councillors within three days of a new city magistracy being established. As 
decreed in their regulations around 1305, these ‘partitioners’ dealt with the 
succession of goods in small inheritances, the settlement of minor debts, 
the supervision of marriages and priestly ordinations (to prevent too lavish 
parties and gift s being given), removing fi re hazards, and dealing with the 
borders between properties. Th e aldermen also charged them with other 
kinds of neighbourhood inspection. 19 
 Th e exact relationship between the ‘revolutionary’ institution of the hun-
dredmen and the older one of the headmen ( hooft mannen ) of the  zestende-
len (the six sections, usually called  ambochten or  offi  cial before the 1330s) 20 
had also to be clarifi ed, as the one potentially rivalled the other. Th e head-
men were selected only from the  poorters (the merchants and property 
 18  Dumolyn and Haemers, ‘Reclaiming the Common Sphere’. A similar example is the 
‘constitutional’ charter of Senlis granted to Ghent in 1301:  M.  Boone , ‘ Het “Charter van Senlis” 
(November 1301) voor de stad Gent: Een stedelijke constitutie in het spanningsveld tussen 
vorst en stad (met uitgave van de tekst) ’,  HMG ,  57 ( 2003 ), 1– 45 (at  44 ) : ‘ceus du commun’. 
 19  Van Caenegem,  Geschiedenis van het strafrecht , p. 304; GVS,  Coutume , vol.  i , pp. 348– 9. 
 20  See  Chapter 2 . 
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owners), while the hundredmen appear to have been recruited largely from 
guild ranks. Surviving sources suggest that the headmen originally oper-
ated only within their own section, with some responsibilities over its polic-
ing, guarding its part of the city defences and leading the contingent of the 
 poorterie of their district in the militia. In the mid fourteenth century the 
college of the headmen developed into a collective institution that repre-
sented the interests of the  poorterie as a whole, as a corporatist counter-
weight to the power of the craft  guilds. Th e headmen assembled under the 
presidency of the St John’s section , the richest section in the town. In 1359 
the hundredmen controlled the accounts for the last time and in 1363 the 
headmen appear in the sources as a fully functioning college. At this point 
their responsibilities become clearer: they dealt with crimes against public 
morality and family aff airs, areas of jurisdiction the aldermen had appro-
priated from ecclesiastical courts. Th ey also assumed the  paisierer function 
of the hundredmen in the early 1360s. In 1384, under Burgundian rule, 
they would temporarily obtain more responsibility as ‘governors’ of the city 
when the guilds were again deprived of their military and political auton-
omy, and from 1399 they were directly appointed by the prince. 21 
 Other courts also had jurisdiction in Bruges or over Bruges citizens, 
notably the comital court of the  Audiencie . From 1386 it was known as the 
 Raedt van Vlaenderen (Council of Flanders ), competent for instance on 
crimes relating to princely jurisdiction such as lèse majesté, and from the 
1450s it would also handle civil cases from Bruges as a court of appeal. Th e 
feudal court of the ‘Burg of Bruges’ dealt with transactions and inheritances 
of fi efs held from the count in both the city and the castellany. 22 From the 
late thirteenth century, Bruges also had its own ecclesiastical court under a 
 sigillifer or ‘seal carrier’, a decentralized delegation of the offi  cial of Tournai 
with limited competence, so that Flemings did not have to travel to Tournai 
for every case. 23 As we have seen, there were also seignorial courts operat-
ing within enclaves of the Bruges territory that had resisted the unifi cation 
 21  Verbruggen,  Vlaanderen na de Guldensporenslag , p. 19; GVS,  Coutume , vol.  i , pp. 281– 4, 327– 
62; Van den Auweele, ‘Schepenbank’, vol.  iii , pp. 296– 7. 
 22  On these comital institutions, see  J.  Buntinx ,  De audiëntie van de graven van 
Vlaanderen: Studie over het centraal grafelijk gerecht (c.1330 – c.1409) ( Brussels ,  1949 );  J .  Van 
Rompaey ,  De Grote Raad van de hertogen van Boergondië en het Parlement van Mechelen 
( Brussels ,  1973 );  D.  Heirbaut ,  Over heren, vazallen en graven: Het persoonlijk leenrecht in 
Vlaanderen ca. 1000– 1305 ( Brussels ,  1997 );  J.  Dumolyn ,  De Raad van Vlaanderen en de 
Rekenkamer van Rijsel: Gewestelijke overheidsinstellingen als instrument van de centralisatie 
(1419– 1477) ( Brussels ,  2002 ). 
 23  M.  Vleeschouwers- Van Melkebeek , ‘ De mazen van het net: Samenwerking tussen de kerkelijke 
rechtbanken van Doornik en Brugge in de late Middeleeuwen ’,  Bulletin de la Commission 
Royale pour la publication des Anciennes Lois et Ordonnances de Belgique ,  43 ( 2002 ), 167– 96 . 
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of the city: the  redenaers , magistrates of the Proosse who also administered 
justice, at least in criminal cases, in the Kanunnikse . 24 Despite these other 
courts, the development of administrative and judicial processes in Bruges 
largely refl ected the increasing institutional hold that the guilds had begun 
to exert over urban government, as well as the strong tendency towards 
legal and political autonomy, an aspiration shared by both the commercial 
elites and the guildsmen. Th is aspiration would be gradually crushed as the 
dukes of Burgundy built up a more centralized state apparatus in the fi f-
teenth century, but the types and competences of city offi  ces and councils 
that had emerged by the mid fourteenth century would largely remain. 25 
 Th e Guilds as Urban Institutions 
 Between the early fourteenth century and the 1370s, during a period of 
constant strife, the craft  guilds developed into institutions that became 
fully integrated into the urban political system. Th ey emerged, in eff ect, 
as a political force that counterbalanced the vested interests of the ruling 
oligarchic families of merchants, hostellers , bankers and landowners and 
represented the interests of the productive classes in society and the petty 
retailers. In many or most cases their delegates may well have belonged to an 
upper group of wealthier guild masters, yet these men could not disregard 
the wider interests of other craft smen, and acted to channel the economic 
and political opinions of their members, who were consulted in assemblies 
of the entire membership or at least of the masters, where the views of the 
rank and fi le would be voiced. We have seen above how the guild wardens , 
the dean and the ‘fi nders’ also served as  smalle wetten (small courts of law) 
to judge on infringements of market regulations ; how, de facto or de iure, 
the craft  guilds also operated as consultative bodies for economic policy; 
how they had the power to reject new taxes or to deliver petitions to the 
city government. 26 But the guilds’ jurisdiction extended beyond economic 
 24  J.  Marechal ,  Inventaris van het Archief van de Proosdij van Sint- Donaas te Brugge ( Brussels , 
 1960 );  L.  Gilliodts- Van Severen (ed.),  Coutume de la prévôté de Bruges , 2 vols. ( Brussels ,  1887 ). 
 25  On Burgundian judicial and institutional centralization in Flanders, see  D.  Lambrecht , 
‘ Centralisatie onder de Bourgondiërs: Van Audiëntie naar Parlement van Mechelen ’, 
 Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden ,  20 ( 1965– 6 ),  83 – 109 ;  W.  Blockmans and  W. 
 Prevenier ,  Th e Promised Lands: Th e Low Countries under Burgundian Rule, 1369– 1530 , trans. 
E. Fackelman ( Philadelphia ,  1999 );  J.  Dumolyn ,  Staatsvorming en vorstelijke ambtenaren in 
het graafschap Vlaanderen (1419– 1477) ( Leuven ,  2003 );  R.  Stein ,  De hertog en zijn staten: De 
eenwording van de Bourgondische Nederlanden, c.1380– c.1480 ( Hilversum ,  2014 ). 
 26  Vermaut, ‘De textielnijverheid’, vol.  ii , pp. 337– 64; Dumolyn, ‘De Brugse ambachtsbesturen’. 
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matters, for the task of organizing their own members, and of working with 
other craft s in city government, required them to promote harmony at all 
political levels. In both guild and city- wide legislation, certain ideal goals 
became stressed above all others, even if they were diffi  cult to achieve in 
times of crisis: peace, brotherly love, unity and justice, including economic 
justice, the possibility of securing a livelihood through honest labour. Th ese 
goals amount to a ‘corporatist ideology’ that dominated political discourse 
within the city. Artisans would hold the urban government accountable for 
defending the ‘common weal’ ( ghemenen oerboer ) of the city which they 
defi ned within this ideology. 27 
 Th e guilds also increased their political autonomy, but in the teeth of 
opposition. For a brief period aft er 1302, while the alliance held between the 
artisans and the comital family, they managed to obtain the most favour-
able privileges they would ever have regarding their internal organization 
and autonomy. Th ey gained the right to elect their own leaders, a demand 
that the Damme guildsmen had articulated in 1280 and one that had surely 
also been circulating in Bruges. Evidence for the precise functioning of 
election procedures is fragmentary for some guilds and non- existent for 
others, however. Th e privileges of the fullers and shearers , probably granted 
in 1303 (although the texts preserved may only have been draught docu-
ments never issued), laid out a complicated procedure for internal elections 
but did not eliminate the role of the city government entirely. Th e guilds 
had to present two lists in which they nominated candidates for the offi  ce 
of warden , from which the magistrates would make the fi nal selection. In 
the fullers’ privilege, journeymen also obtained the right to be represented 
among the wardens. Th e brokers’ privilege, dated 8 May 1303, apparently 
did not then have such autonomy: a later charter, dated 8 June 1306, stated 
that ‘from now on, they shall choose their sworn men themselves’. Probably 
the fi rst Flemish guild to gain the right to elect new guild wardens was the 
Bruges butchers in their privilege of 2 December 1302, secured only a few 
months aft er the victory at Kortrijk (11 July). Th is charter highlights the 
complexity of our picture of these early election procedures. Th e newly 
elected leaders were to share electoral power with four men appointed by 
the ‘community’ ( meentucht ) of the craft  guild, in other words the assembly 
 27  Dumolyn, ‘Het corporatieve element’; Wyff els,  De oorsprong , pp. 47– 8, 75;  J.- P.  Sosson , ‘ Die 
Körperschaft en in den Niederlanden und Nordfrankreich: Neue Forschungsperspektiven ’, 
in  K.  Friedland (ed.)  Gilden und Korporationen in den nordeuropäischen Städten des späten 
Mittelalters ( Cologne ,  1984 ), pp. 79– 90 (at  82 ) ;  M.  Boone , ‘ Armes, coursses, assemblees et 
commocions: Les gens de métiers et l’usage de la violence dans la société urbaine fl amande à la 
din du Moyen Âge ’,  RN ,  359 ( 2005 ), 7– 34 (at  20– 4 ). 
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of all the guild masters. Together they were to choose six men, one to be the 
‘shield bearer’ (military leader), and fi ve to be ‘fi nders ’, with the offi  ces to be 
apportioned by lot. It seems that these six men were then to select the dean 
together with the whole guild, or at least with the approval of all members 
gathered at a meeting. Th ough the charter does not describe the process 
exactly, it involved seeking consensus rather than using ballots. 28 
 However, there were limits to full participation of guild members in 
elections, and to the autonomy of their procedures. Where consensus was 
sought in elections, the voices of the most wealthy and socially prestigious 
guild members probably dominated. It is unclear which guilds allowed 
journeymen to participate in meetings, but the majority probably did not; 
while apprentice boys and female members had no say in internal guild 
politics. Socio- economic and political hierarchies existed within guilds, as 
we shall see: we need to avoid too rosy a picture of ‘guild democracy’. And 
guild autonomy was also opposed. When artisan revolts were suppressed, 
the count and urban authorities would typically substitute the dean elected 
by the guild masters (sometimes also by the journeymen) with a  maenre 
(translatable as ‘summoner’) or a  beleeder (although this could also refer to 
an outside military leader of the guilds in the militia).  Maenres or  beleeders 
were recruited from the urban elites, and were oft en imposed on the Bruges 
guilds aft er corporatist revolts had failed, for instance (as we shall see) in 
1328, 1348, 1380 and 1384. 29 
 Guilds were not simply economic and political organizations: the corpo-
ratist values they promoted encompassed other aspects of urban life. Th ey 
regulated moral behaviour according to the guild ethos of brotherly love 
and they organized charitable activities in ways that helped maintain social 
order. Th ey promoted festive social events and ceremonies to reinforce 
their solidarity. An integral part of their assumption of greater political 
power was the manner in which they established a religious and architec-
tural presence in the urban landscape. Information about guild buildings 
is fragmentary, and some guilds may have possessed chapels at an early 
date: the carpenters had a chapel in the Franciscan church by 1300. But dur-
ing the fourteenth century, as we have seen ( Chapter 6 ), the more impor-
tant craft  guilds certainly began to construct new guild houses and chapels. 
 28  Th ese charters are edited in Espinas and Pirenne (eds.),  Recueil , vol.  i , pp. 532– 52; see also 
 C.  Wyff els , ‘ Twee oude Vlaamse ambachtskeuren: De vleeshouwers van Brugge (2 december 
1302) en de smeden van Damme (eerste helft  1303) ’,  HGG ,  87 ( 1950 ), 93– 109 (at  94– 5 ,  105– 6 , 
 109 ) ; Van Houtte, ‘Makelaars en waarden’, p. 7. 
 29  R.  Demuynck , ‘ De Gentse oorlog (1379– 1385): Oorzaken en karakter ’,  HMG ,  5 ( 1951 ), 305– 18 
(at  306– 7 ). 
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Guild altars would be furnished with the guild’s own liturgical objects and 
vestments adorned with its symbols, and every guild would have had a cof-
fer containing devotional artefacts. Stained glass windows in side chapels of 
major churches could include the images of craft  guilds and of their patron 
saints. Th e guild chapel also had an administrative function, particularly 
before the fi ft eenth century when the majority of guilds did not have their 
own guildhouse: a chapel could serve as a guild meeting place, or storage 
space for the guild archives and silverwork. 30 
 Th is increasingly visible presence of guilds in the urban landscape, and 
within its sacred spaces, no doubt helped to strengthen their political status 
in relation to commercial and noble families who were similarly active in 
prestige constructions. But this distinction between ‘guild’ and ‘commer-
cial’ interests was not hard and fast (as later comment on factions in Bruges 
will show); and despite guild promotion of corporatist ideals, attempts by 
workers to establish new guilds were not oft en welcomed by existing guilds. 
By the end of the fourteenth century the number of Bruges craft  guilds 
stabilized at fi ft y- four, and any new trade could only take the institutional 
form of a  poortersnering (burgher trade), whose members would be politi-
cally represented by the  poorterie . 31 Th e porters at the Old Mill Bridge , for 
instance, were prevented from organizing themselves into a proper craft  
guild, and in their case, the religious fraternity they founded, devoted to 
Our Lady and approved by the city government in 1425, may have served 
as a surrogate craft  organization: the regulations of this fraternity included 
ones on work and morality that were similar to other craft  guilds, yet they 
had no political rights. 32 Moreover, corporatist discourse did not eliminate 
competition between guilds, and there oft en remained a gap between the 
ideals of unity and the many confl icting interests and identities that the 
world of the craft smen represented. 
 A Century of Social and Political Struggle 
 Guild power in fourteenth- century Bruges in some aspects reached a level 
found in few other European cities outside the southern Low Countries 
 30  On the collective devotion of the guilds, see also  Chapter 8 . 
 31  Parmentier,  Indices , vol.  i , passim; Vandewalle, ‘De Brugse stadsmagistraat’. 
 32  L.  Gilliodts- Van Severen (ed.),  Mémoriaux de Bruges ( Bruges ,  1913 ), vol.  i, pp.  9 – 14 ; on 
the various associations of Bruges porters, see A. Vandewalle, ‘Arbeiders aan de kade’, in 
Vandewalle (ed.),  Hanzekooplui en Medicibankiers , pp. 105– 6; and Vandewalle, ‘Hafen und 
Hafenarbeit’. 
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and the Rhineland . But its growth was sporadic and took place amidst great 
political uncertainty. Th e Flemings may have won the Battle of Kortrijk 
in 1302 and survived the Battle of Mons- en- Pévèle in 1304, but they were 
forced in 1305 to accept the humiliating treaty of Athis- sur- Orge . 33 Th e 
French king imposed a massive fi ne on the Flemings, and ordered a puni-
tive pilgrimage to be undertaken by no fewer than 3,000 male burghers. Th e 
exiled ‘Lilies ’ (the pro- French party which included the majority of the mer-
chant class) returned to their hometowns and recovered their confi scated 
property. With their return, the fragile compromise between the propertied 
classes and the guilds, within the newly established political system, was 
put under pressure. A fear that the old ruling families would reassert their 
authority in Bruges probably caused artisans to wring from Count Robert 
a decree, dated 28 March 1306, that testifi es to their aspirations to legal 
and political equality: the decree stated that all burghers of Bruges ‘whether 
guildsmen or others, should all be equally free’ (‘soient gens de mestier ou 
autre, soient également franc, aussi avant li uns ke li autres’). 34 
 Th e history of fourteenth- century Bruges, until the Valois dukes of 
Burgundy assumed comital power in 1384, would be marked by frequent 
rebellion and other forms of collective action. Th e guilds, and especially 
the four textile guilds of the weavers , fullers , shearers and dyers , were at 
the forefront of these movements. It must be emphasized, however, that 
the artisans only rebelled when they saw their privileges and economic 
welfare seriously threatened. In most cases the Janus- faced guild organiza-
tions played a stabilizing role, seeking compromise between warring groups 
rather than stirring up class antagonisms. But their eff orts were vitiated by 
the limited nature of their political power: guild participation in the urban 
government was oft en more theoretical than real. But at least the com-
mon artisans preferred it over the oligarchic rule that had existed in the 
thirteenth century. Th e principle that nine of the thirteen aldermen and 
councillors had to be nominated by the craft  guilds operated only in some 
periods (as the prosopographical research thus far undertaken suggests). 35 
Th e fragile nature and changing roles of institutions like the hundredmen 
and the headmen, and the severe restrictions sometimes imposed on the 
autonomy and the infl uence of the craft  guilds, should also be explained 
by alterations in the balance of power within the city. As stated above, one 
of the main underlying causes of unrest in Bruges politics throughout the 
 33  R.  Lesaff er , ‘ Cedant arma togae: De vrede van Athis- sur- Orge (1305) ’, in  P.  Trio ,  D.  Heirbaut 
and  D.  van den Auweele (eds.),  Omtrent 1302 ( Leuven ,  2002 ), pp.  161– 81 . 
 34  GVS,  Coutume , vol.  i , p. 366. 
 35  See the references in  note 17 in this chapter. 
9781108419659c06-08_p196-389.indd   282 12/12/2017   12:06:37 PM
283Political Power and Social Groups, c.1300–c.1500
283
later Middle Ages was, broadly speaking, the structural fracture between 
two main groups: the commercial elites and rentiers, on the one hand, and 
the producing classes and smaller retailers for the local markets, on the 
other. While the latter tended to support a corporatist approach to ruling 
the city, the former made continual eff orts to eliminate it and restore their 
power, even if the commercial families were themselves oft en divided by 
business and factional interests. 36 Th is generalization will need to be quali-
fi ed, but it provides a useful guideline for understanding the main tensions 
in Bruges politics from the fourteenth century onwards. Th e Flemish politi-
cal revolution of 1302 was a victory for the middle and working classes, but 
the merchant elites also retained much of their power, especially because 
the count of Flanders soon sided with them again, abandoning his tempo-
rary coalition with the commoners against the king of France. Very soon 
cracks appeared in the united front of guildsmen. By 1309, in Bruges and in 
Ghent , some prosperous commercial guilds, such as the brokers , butchers 
and fi shmongers , were siding with the pro- French Lily faction against the 
textile workers. 37 
 As the Bruges ‘popular front’ of 1302 withered away, the new count, 
Robert de Béthune, lost the support of the common guildsmen as a result 
of his increasingly autocratic policies. Other members of the comital family 
sided with the French again and the Lily party regained much of its infl u-
ence. 38 Between 1310 and 1320, the initial success of the guilds in gaining 
positions in city governments ran up against a reaction from the old com-
mercial elite. In 1316, 25 per cent of the Bruges aldermen once again came 
from the top 5 per cent of taxpayers. 39 On 26 March and 24 April 1309, 
Pieter de Coninck and Jan Heme , a fuller who had also played an important 
role in 1302, led many artisans in risings against the provisions of the treaty 
of Athis- sur- Orges . Th eir guild banners were deployed, and their armed 
followers turned on the  poorters , the brokers , the butchers and fi shmon-
gers . 40 During the two centuries to come, artisan revolts would continue to 
 36  J.  Braekevelt ,  F.  Buylaert ,  J .  Dumolyn et al., ‘ Th e Politics of Factional Confl ict in Late Medieval 
Flanders ’,  Historical Research ,  85 ( 2012 ),  1 – 31 . 
 37  Johnstone (ed.),  Annals of Ghent , p. 95. 
 38  J.  Sabbe , ‘ De opstand van Brugge tegen graaf Robrecht van Bethune en zijn zoon Robrecht van 
Kassel in 1321– 1322: Het laatste politieke optreden van de volksleiders Pieter de Coninc en Jan 
Breidel ’,  HGG ,  107 ( 1970 ),  217– 49 . 
 39  R.  van Uytven , ‘ Plutokratie in de “oude demokratieën der Nederlanden”: Cijfers en 
beschouwingen omtrent de korporatieve organisatie en de sociale struktuur der gemeenten in 
de late middeleeuwen ’,  HKZM ,  17 ( 1962 ), 373– 409 (at  390– 2 ). 
 40  B.  Schotte , ‘ Beroering in Brugge en de moorden op Michiel van Lo en Pieter uten Sacke, 1309 ’, 
 HGG ,  144 ( 2007 ),  5 – 27 . 
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use a fi xed set of rituals of mobilization: ringing bells and shouting rallying 
cries, attacking the houses of enemies within the city, and organizing armed 
assemblies ( wapeninghe or  auweet ) at the Market Square. Th eir actions 
were preceded and accompanied by a vibrant culture of political speech 
acts ranging from muttering in inns and workshops, formulating petitions 
in meetings and shouting defi ant slogans against rulers they considered 
unworthy to lead the city. 41 Th is was the fundamental character of ‘popular 
politics’ in Bruges: even in times when the middle and lower classes had no 
say in the town government, they would continue to put pressure on the 
elites by voicing their opinions and threatening instability. 42 
 During the early decades of the fourteenth century, tensions in Bruges 
sharpened as Count Robert de Béthune and the king of France continued 
their hostilities, while the burghers tired of the confl ict and the heavy fi nan-
cial toll it imposed on them. In 1318 confl ict arose between Bruges and 
Robert de Béthune, and in 1321– 2 an open revolt against the count broke 
out, led by radical textile workers . Th is time the divisions cut right through 
social groups and guilds. Th e butcher Jan Breydel now opposed his erst-
while comrade Pieter de Coninck (the latter supporting the count), and he 
was followed by most (though not all) of the textile workers. 43 In 1323 the 
count, never enthusiastic about the political role his family had been forced 
to grant the guilds, reacted with new election rules. Th e date for appointing 
the magistrates was to be changed to 11 October; and a college of eight elec-
tors was to be set up, four of them chosen by the count and four by the city, 
who would then choose the new aldermen. In 1324 the new count, Louis of 
Nevers, issued a further regulation, reserving to himself the exclusive right 
to appoint the magistrates; although failure to do so within eight days aft er 
2 February, would give the outgoing aldermen the right to appoint them. 44 
It seems, however, that this charter was never put into eff ect, for by then a 
 41  Boone, ‘Armes’;  R.  Verbruggen ,  Geweld in Vlaanderen: Macht en onderdrukking in de Vlaamse 
steden tijdens de veertiende eeuw ( Bruges ,  2005 );  J.  Haemers , ‘ A Moody Community? Emotion 
and Ritual in Late Medieval Urban Revolts ’, in  E.  Lecuppre- Desjardin and  A.- L.  Van Bruaene 
(eds.),  Emotions in the Heart of the City (14th– 16th Century) ( Turnhout ,  2005 ), pp.  63 – 81 ; 
 J.  Dumolyn and  J.  Haemers , ‘ A Bad Chicken Was Brooding: Subversive Speech in Late 
Medieval Flanders ’,  Past and Present ,  214 ( 2012 ),  45 – 86 ;  J.  Dumolyn , ‘ Th e Vengeance of the 
Commune: Sign Systems of Popular Politics in Medieval Bruges ’, in  H. R.  Oliva Herrer ,  V. 
 Challet ,  J.  Dumolyn et al. (eds.),  La comunidad medieval como esfera publica ( Seville ,  2014 ), pp. 
 251– 89 . 
 42  C.  Liddy and  J.  Haemers , ‘ Popular Politics in the Late Medieval City: York and Bruges ’,  English 
Historical Review ,  128 ( 2013 ),  771 – 805 . 
 43  Sabbe, ‘De opstand’; Verbruggen,  Geweld , pp. 32– 40. 
 44  Van den Auweele, ‘Schepenbank’, vol.  ii , pp. 163– 4;  T.  de Limburg- Stirum (ed.),  Codex 
Diplomaticus Flandriae , 2 vols. ( Bruges ,  1889 ), pp.  365– 6 . 
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major revolt had broken out in Flanders. Th e attempt of the count to pacify 
the revolt in 1324 failed, and hostility to his rule escalated between 1324 
and 1326 in western Flanders, and in Bruges itself. 45 
 Th e chronology, causality and social character of the ‘revolt of Maritime 
Flanders’ (1323– 8) still needs further study (which is made diffi  cult by 
the disappearance of many documents for these years from the Bruges 
archives). 46 As with most rebellions in Flanders, the revolt was not a 
straightforward clash of social classes. At fi rst, the protests of the rebels of 
the castellany of Bruges and other rural districts in coastal Flanders were 
aimed at the abuses in tax collection by the ruling elites – and more specifi -
cally members of the castellany’s noblemen who were thought to be exploit-
ing the commoners to line their own pockets. Factional divisions among 
these ruling elites (some of whom were excluded from political participa-
tion) also played a small but crucial part. However, the rising was soon 
joined by a Bruges coalition of artisans and some disgruntled members 
of the city’s commercial elite. Discontent with Count Robert , who died in 
1322, and then with his son Count Louis of Nevers, was reinforced by the 
policies of John of Namur (Louis’ uncle):  he held the Bruges outport of 
Sluis as a fi ef and had tried to draw away the foreign merchants from the 
city to Sluis ’ more accessible harbour. As a result, on 1 August 1323, the 
Bruges militia put Sluis to the torch (see below). In February 1324 , a full- 
scale rebellion broke out in the city and the merchant- dominated govern-
ment was overthrown. Willem de Deken , a moderately rich broker who was 
burgomaster of the commune during the revolt, was sent to England on a 
diplomatic mission to gather support. He led a rebellious coalition unit-
ing various social groups though with the textile workers as its backbone. 47 
Peasants and artisans joined forces and until 1328 a large part of the county 
resisted the young count’s weak political authority. At one point in 1325, 
Count Louis was taken prisoner in Kortrijk and brought over to Bruges, 
from where he eventually managed to escape. Aft er a failed peace treaty in 
1326, on 23 August 1328 the rebellion was fi nally crushed by a French army 
at Cassel . Bruges had to send 500 hostages to Paris , among whom were 
many textile workers, a number of veterans from the struggles of 1302 and 
the subsequent confl icts, but also some rich burghers who had supported 
 45  Sabbe, ‘De opstand’, p. 24. 
 46  On this revolt, see in general  J.  Sabbe ,  Vlaanderen in opstand 1323– 1328: Nikolaas 
Zannekin, Zeger Janszone en Willem de Deken ( Bruges ,  1992 );  W.  TeBrake ,  A Plague of 
Insurrection: Popular Politics and Peasant Revolt in Flanders, 1323– 1328 ( Philadelphia ,  1993 ). 
 47  A.  Vandewalle , ‘ Willem de Deken ( † 1328): Volksleider en makelaar ’,  HGG ,  115 ( 1978 ),  207– 11 . 
9781108419659c06-08_p196-389.indd   285 12/12/2017   12:06:38 PM
286 Jan Dumolyn et al.
286
the revolt. Th e rebel leader Willem de Deken was executed in Paris . 48 Th e 
new ‘privilege’ of 1329 severely limited Bruges’ autonomy from the count, 
and the power of the guilds. Many of the gains of 1304 were now reversed, 
and the terms of the  Keure of 1281 were reinstated. Th e city government 
could no longer tax or make laws without the bailiff ’s permission; the craft  
guilds could no longer choose their own leadership; and the judicial com-
petence of the aldermen was reduced while the role of the central offi  cers 
and comital justice was reinforced. Most importantly, the count demanded 
that he alone would have full right to appoint the aldermen. 49 
 In the years aft er 1330, however, Louis of Nevers began to moderate these 
regulations. Comital power weakened, especially because of the outbreak of 
war between the kings of France and England . Louis was caught between 
his vassalic loyalty to the French crown, and the economic interests of his 
Flemish townsmen, who were dependent on English wool. King Edward III 
used this dependence to force Louis ’ hand, while the Flemings exerted pres-
sure on their count. In 1336 the English banned the export of wool to the 
county, thus causing a severe crisis in its textile centres. Ghent and Bruges 
despatched their militias to help Louis of Nevers block the entrance into 
Sluis and the Westerscheldt stream at the island of Cadzand but they were 
defeated by an English fl eet. To obtain the favour of Bruges, Count Louis 
acquitted the fi ne he had imposed aft er the 1323– 8 revolt and revoked the 
order to demolish the urban fortifi cations (which, as we have seen, had not 
been properly carried out). On 6 January 1338, the count also restored an 
important Bruges privilege prohibiting the confi scation of burghers’ prop-
erties, and on 24 April he restored all other privileges that had been abol-
ished in 1329  ‘because of the good conduct’ of the city. Th e 1304  Keure 
again obtained the force of law. 50 Amid the political turmoil and comital 
concessions, guild power in Bruges was quickly re- established; and without 
the least gratitude to the count for his concessions, between 1338 and 1348 
the city joined with Ghent in its revolt against the count, led by the famous 
rebel captain James of Artevelde . 51 During the fi rst Artevelde years, comital 
 48  R. C.  Van Caenegem , ‘ Nota over de terechtstelling van Willem de Deken in Parijs in 1328 ’, 
 HGG ,  90 ( 1953 ),  140– 2 . 
 49  J.  Van Rompaey , ‘ De Brugse Keure van 1329 en de aanvullende privileges ’,  Bulletin de la 
Commission Royale pour la publication des Anciennes Lois et Ordonnances de Belgique ,  21 
( 1965 ),  35 – 105 . 
 50  GVS,  Coutume , vol.  i , pp. 405– 9. 
 51  On the ‘Artevelde period in Bruges’, see  L.  Gilliodts- van Severen , ‘ Jacques van Artevelde ’,  La 
Flandre: Revue des Monuments d’Histoire et d’antiquités ,  10 ( 1879 ),  257 – 314 ,  375 – 443 ;  H. S. 
 Lucas ,  Th e Low Countries and the Hundred Years’ War (1326– 1347) ( Ann Arbor ,  1929 );  P. 
 Rogghé ,  Vlaanderen en het zevenjarig beleid van Jacob van Artevelde, 1338– 1345: Een critisch- 
historische studie , 2 vols. ( Brussels ,  1942 );  H.  Van Werveke ,  Jacob van Artevelde ( Th e Hague , 
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rule was all but at an end: this is the period that some historians have called 
‘the age of the Flemish city states’, when in practice Bruges co- ruled the 
county with Ghent and Ypres (though Ghent tended to dominate). 52 
 Further light needs shedding on internal events in Bruges around this 
period; but it is clear that the crisis in the Flemish textile industry had hit 
Bruges especially hard, and that the same groups who had ruled the city in 
1323– 8 went on to support Artevelde . 53 For half a century to come, the tex-
tile workers would grow increasingly radical in their struggle but they also 
became isolated from most other guilds: small retailers tended to be more 
conservative and prudent, preferring to side with the commercial elite and 
rentiers. Bruges would now lose its reputation as Flanders’ most rebellious 
town to Ghent , its larger and more industrial neighbour. Th e crisis of the 
Bruges textile industry meant its workers lost political infl uence, though 
they continued to voice their grievances. For instance, in 1344 the shearers 
went on strike to demand higher wages. Th e political situation remained 
tense until Artevelde ’s death in 1345. 54 In 1348, the pro- comital party in 
Bruges regained the upper hand, and the city was reconciled with the new 
count, Louis of Male. 55 Louis confi rmed all Bruges’ privileges, forgiving the 
city for its rebellion , probably because he considered Ghent a more danger-
ous threat and needed Bruges as an ally. 56 
 Louis of Male, a far shrewder politician than his two predecessors, soon 
mastered Ghent and Ypres , and established fi rm rule in Flanders. Politics 
remained turbulent, however. Th e period aft er 1348 witnessed the Black 
Death , popular religious upheaval with the ‘fl agellants’ , and crises within 
the textile industry . Th e weavers , fullers , shearers and dyers attempted to 
maintain their political power. Th e ideal of more popular and representa-
tive rule, the political heritage of 1302, was now threatened by the oligarchic 
 1982 );  D.  Nicholas ,  Th e Van Arteveldes of Ghent: Th e Varieties of Vendetta and the Hero in 
History ( Leiden ,  1988 ). Until now, these revolts and this period in the history of Bruges have 
not been suffi  ciently studied. For a state- of- the- art survey, see  J.  Dumolyn and  M.  Lenoir , ‘ De 
sociaal- politieke verhoudingen binnen het Brugse stadsbestuur tijdens het midden van de 
veertiende eeuw (1329– 1361) ’,  HGG ,  151 ( 2015 ),  323– 76 . 
 52  Rogghé, ‘Vlaanderen’, vol.  ii , pp. 13– 15; and in general  D.  Nicholas ,  Town and 
Countryside: Social, Economic, and Political Tensions in Fourteenth- Century Flanders ( Bruges , 
 1971 );  W.  Prevenier and  M.  Boone , ‘ Th e City- State Dream ’, in  J.  Decavele (ed.),  Ghent: In 
Defence of a Rebellious City: History, Art, Culture ( Antwerp ,  1989 ), pp. 81– 105 (at  101– 5 ). 
 53  Dumolyn and Lenoir, ‘De sociaal- politieke verhoudingen’. 
 54  Vermaut, ‘De textielnijverheid’, vol.  ii , pp. 339– 40. 
 55  P.  Rogghé , ‘ Gemeente ende Vrient: Nationale omwentelingen in de XIVde eeuw ’,  HGG ,  89 
( 1952 ), 101– 35 (at  114– 17 ). 
 56  GVS,  Coutume , vol.  i , pp. 410– 14;  T.  de Limburg- Stirum (ed.),  Cartulaire de Louis de Male, 
comte de Flandre , 2 vols. ( Bruges ,  1898– 1909 ), vol.  i , pp.  13 – 15 . 
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tendencies of merchants, brokers and richer craft smen who did not espouse 
the corporate ideal as much as the textile workers did. Th ere were riots and 
revolts in which textile workers played the main role. In 1351, 1359, 1361, 
1367 and 1369 collective actions broke out in Bruges. Most were unsuccess-
ful as they seemed unable to forge the necessary alliances between diff erent 
social groups to achieve victory; but between 1359 and 1361 (though the 
events are unclear) the textile workers and the guilds in general were briefl y 
able to restore their political power. In May 1359 there were heavy riots on 
the Market Square. In July the textile guilds faced the other craft s in a vio-
lent struggle, and changes of government followed. On 2 March 1360, an 
agreement was sealed by ‘all the commoners’ (‘al tcommun ghemeenlike 
van der stede van Brucghe’) to maintain the peace, but aft er April 1360 new 
confl icts broke out. Ultimately in September 1361 a peace was concluded. 
A new compromise was established between commoners and the  poorterie , 
similar to the one aft er 1302. On 3 September 1361, Louis once again for-
gave the city for its rebellions , illegal meetings and violence, clearly because 
he lacked the power to intervene more aggressively. Th is charter of peace 
was sealed by all the guilds. 57 
 Aft er the events of 1359– 61, the city’s representative institutions – those 
that included larger groups of people than the aldermen and councillors – 
assumed a more stable form. During the early 1360s eff orts were appar-
ently made to restore the fragile social and political balance that had existed 
within the city since 1304, and to develop a clearer constitutional frame-
work that could encapsulate the ideal of the city as a corporate entity and 
channel the political voices of the guilds. During the decades that followed 
1360, the city’s body politic was increasingly referred to as ‘the common 
body’ ( de ghemeene buke or  den gheheelen lechame ende ghemeente van der 
stede ). Depending on the particular balance of forces in place aft er political 
upheavals, from this period onwards the principle of guild representation on 
the ‘bench’ of aldermen (established in 1304 but in practice oft en neglected) 
gradually became institutionalized in the system of the ‘Nine Members ’ in 
which every ‘member’ of the body politic comprised either a certain group 
of craft  guilds or the  poorterie . Th e Nine Members , a terminology fi xed in 
 57  For this period, see J. Mertens, ‘Woelingen te Brugge tussen 1359 en 1361’, in Hansotte and 
Coppejans (eds.),  Album Carlos Wyff els , pp. 325– 32 (at 326– 7);  M.  Boone , ‘ Le comté de 
Flandre dans le long XIVe siècle: Une société urbanisée face aux crises du bas Moyen Âge ’, in 
 M.  Bourin ,  G.  Cherubini and  G.  Pinto (eds.),  Rivolte urbane e rivolte contadine nell’ Europa del 
trecento: Un confronto ( Florence ,  2008 ), pp.  17 – 47 ;  J.  Vuylsteke , ‘ De Goede Disendach ’,  HMG , 
 1 ( 1894– 5 ),  9 – 47 ; Demuynck, ‘De Gentse oorlog’; GVS,  Coutume , vol.  i , pp. 416– 21; GVS, 
 Inventaire , vol.  ii , pp. 107, 119. 
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the later fi ft eenth century but already apparent as an organizing principle, 
were divided according to economic sectors. Th e fi rst Member was the 
 poorterie , representing the interests of the commercial and landed elites. 
Th e second brought together the four textile guilds. Th e third assembled 
the butchers and fi shmongers . Th e fourth was called ‘the Seventeen Small 
Guilds ’, mainly from the building industry . Th e fi ft h was known as ‘the 
guilds of the Hammer ’ ( van den haemere ), and grouped the metal workers 
together. Th e sixth included the guilds ‘of the Leather’ ( van den ledere ), the 
various leather workers. Th e seventh, ‘the guilds of the Needle’ ( van den 
naelde ), comprised the clothing workers. Th e eighth included the bakers , 
millers and some subordinate guilds. Th e ninth and last Member consisted 
of the large brokers’ guild . As we have seen, the fi rst Member, the  poorterie , 
was led by the headman of the St John’s section , while the other eight were 
all led by what would eventually be called a ‘heavy dean ’ ( zwaerdeken , a 
term encountered in 1464) who was the dean of the principal guild of the 
Member in question, for instance the weavers’ dean for the textile guilds 
and the blacksmiths’ dean for the ‘Hammer’. From 1363 onwards, the reg-
isters of ‘the new laws’ ( wetsvernieuwinghe ) appear in the Bruges archives, 
listing for each year all the burgomasters , aldermen, councillors , treasur-
ers , headmen ,  deelmannen , members of urban commissions for quality and 
market control, and all the deans and fi nders of the fi ft y- four guilds. Aft er 
1361 (or 1363) the Nine Member system , even if not referred to, was prob-
ably used to nominate the aldermen and the councillors, meaning that the 
 poorterie would obtain four of the thirteen seats (including the burgomas-
ters’) in each institution, and the guilds the other nine. In practice, though, 
its application continued to depend on whether the guilds or merchants 
were dominant in the city and was thus discarded at various times during 
the following century and a half. 58 
 Th e term ‘common body’ and its variants were also used for a new gov-
ernment institution known as the Great Council ( grote raed ): its member-
ship included all the guild deans and the six captains of the sections, the 
latter as representatives of the  poorterie . Assemblies representing the entire 
commune and advising the city government had doubtless gathered earlier, 
though their forms are ill recorded. Th e  meentucht had gathered in 1280; 
during the Artevelde Revolt (1338– 45), a ‘Great Council ’ of the city made 
decisions alongside the college of aldermen. Evidence for others has to be 
gleaned from the city accounts as they did not produce reports before the 
later fi ft eenth century. For instance, in 1357 the headmen , guild deans and 
 58  Vandewalle, ‘De Brugse stadsmagistraat’. 
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fi nders met to deal with a weighty fi nancial issue, and represented the entire 
commune. 59 Assemblies of the ‘commune’ or  ghemeente were probably also 
formalized during the reforms of the early 1360s to become meetings of the 
Great Council , and these would include the captains of the burghers and all 
the guild deans. Taxes and troops would only be granted to the prince by 
meetings of ‘den ghemeenen van den stede’ (the common of the city), or ‘al 
tghemeente’ (the whole commune), but it is not always clear whether such 
meetings meant an assembly of the entire Great Council in its embryonic 
or developed form. More restricted consultative meetings also continued 
to take place, those of ‘good people’ ( bonnes gens or  goede lieden ), usually 
members of the commercial class of merchants, hostellers and brokers , with 
only six headmen and the nine or eighteen most important deans present, 
along with former aldermen and burgomaster s. Nonetheless, in its vary-
ing forms the Great Council would remain a part of the city’s institutions, 
even if its political weight and frequency of meeting varied. In 1388 and 
1399, for instance, meetings of the urban government and ‘toute la com-
munaulté’ are mentioned. In the fi ft eenth century we encounter meetings 
of the headman with all the guild deans and sworn men or at least the nine 
or eighteen principal deans. Th e Great Council , by then oft en referred to as 
‘de ghemeene buke van der stede’ (the common belly of the city), appears to 
have assumed competence over all important fi nancial and fi scal matters. 
During the revolts of 1436– 8 and in the years 1477– 85 and 1488 , it played 
a major role in ruling the city. From then on, it became a more subservient 
institution. 60 While further research is needed, it is clear that the creation 
of the Nine Members and the Great Council were institutional attempts to 
resolve political instability within the city:  they off ered popular forms of 
representation for guilds and artisans that could act as counterweights to 
the power of the city government, which without pressure from below usu-
ally acted in the interests of the propertied elites and the prince. 
 Th e City and its Hinterland 
 Th e economic, social and political development of Bruges did not take 
place in isolation from the surrounding countryside; an understanding of 
the city’s internal history must take account of Bruges’ relations with its 
 59  GVS,  Inventaire , vol.  ii , p. 28. 
 60  W.  Blockmans ,  De volksvertegenwoordiging in Vlaanderen in de overgang van middeleeuwen 
naar nieuwe tijden (1384– 1506) ( Brussels ,  1978 ), pp.  81– 7 . 
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rural neighbours and the Zwin ports. Th e relationship between the city 
and the rural district (castellany) of the ‘Liberty of Bruges ’ ( Brugse Vrije , 
 Franc de Bruges ), a fairly prosperous area, was ambivalent at best. As we 
have seen, when the castellany was fi rst installed under Count Baldwin IV 
(r.988– 1035), the  castrum of Bruges became its administrative centre, and 
for about a century, town and countryside were governed as a single, insep-
arable whole. Probably just before 1100, when Bruges developed as a legal 
and political entity, the city was institutionally detached from the castellany. 
Th e two remained linked, however, because the principal seat of the Liberty 
aldermen remained in Bruges (and from their residence in the Burg square 
these aldermen would continue to govern the castellany until the end of 
the ancien régime ). 61 But the institutional separation of town and castel-
lany did not prevent tensions between them. Violent clashes, arising from 
court cases between the citizens of Bruges and inhabitants of the Liberty, 
evidently took place in the Burg square , for on 22 July 1289, the count was 
moved to condemn them. 62 As both Bruges and the castellany relied pri-
marily on their respective customary laws and their writs of privilege to 
determine their rights of jurisdiction, marking out their rights in relation 
to each other was an ongoing process . A formal agreement between Bruges 
and the Liberty was fi rst chartered in 1318. It would become known as ‘the 
seventeen points’ and it dealt with confl icts of judicial competence, crimi-
nal law , taxes from toll rights, local legislation, mobilization in wartime and 
burgher rights. 63 In 1322 new tensions arose over textiles, and at the request 
of Bruges, the count forbade the sale of textiles in the Liberty , outside of the 
smaller privileged cities, except those produced in the villages themselves 
and in free annual fairs. In 1342, during the Artevelde period, this measure 
was extended to a ban on rural cloth production except for small- scale and 
domestic use. Th is charter was enforced by Bruges militias who destroyed 
looms, fulling tubs and shearing tenters in the villages. 64 Th roughout the 
later Middle Ages several points of contention dogged relations between 
 61  A. C. F.  Koch ,  De rechterlijke organisatie van het graafschap Vlaanderen tot in de 13  de   eeuw 
( Antwerp and Amsterdam ,  1951 ), pp.  124– 35 , E. Huys, ‘Kasselrij van het Brugse Vrije’, in 
Prevenier and Augustyn (eds.),  De gewestelijke en lokale overheidsinstellingen , pp. 461– 78 
(at 461– 4); Warlop, ‘De vorming’. Th e aldermen of some other seignories, like the one of the 
Sijseelse, would also assemble in Bruges, and so did the comital feudal court of the ‘Burg of 
Bruges’. 
 62  On this so- called practice of ‘burgstorm’, see, GVS,  Coutume , vol.  i , pp. 257– 8. 
 63  W.  Prevenier , ‘ Het Brugse Vrije en de Leden van Vlaanderen ’,  HGG ,  96 ( 1959 ),  5 – 60 ; Nicholas, 
 Town and Countryside , pp. 59, 69– 71, 102– 8, 142– 7; Blockmans,  De volksvertegenwoordiging , 
pp. 126, 129– 35; Dumolyn, De  Brugse opstand , pp. 101– 2; GVS,  Coutume , vol.  i , pp. 379– 92; 
GVS,  Inventaire , vol.  i , pp. 325– 8. 
 64  GVS,  Inventaire , vol.  i , pp. 337– 9; Van Houtte,  De geschiedenis van Brugge , p. 119. 
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the two legal entities:  political and military issues, trade and commerce, 
the production of cloth and its marketing in the villages (a direct threat to 
the Bruges textile guilds), and the particularly thorny problem of ‘outbur-
ghership’. Th is was the right to burghership (typical in Flemish towns) that 
a non- resident could acquire when he or she resided for a certain period 
in town. In Bruges, they were called the  hagepoorters (hedge burghers). 
Outburghership was oft en acquired by rural elites to avoid paying taxes in 
their own castellany. Many of them lived elsewhere, away from the city, but 
some of the Bruges outburghers lived in the city’s immediate vicinity, out-
side its ramparts but still within the judicial authority of the aldermen. 65 
 Although relations with the Liberty were frequently tense, they did not 
become as divisive as relations could sometimes be with Sluis , Bruges’ out-
port in the Zwin estuary. Th e confl ict in 1323 involving John of Namur was 
particularly serious. In 1305 John had become lord of Lamminsvliet or Sluis 
which had only recently been established. Because of the gradual silting of 
the Zwin , Sluis rapidly became important as the place where seagoing ships 
had to stop to unload freight into, or receive it from, smaller boats that 
could pass further upstream. It was vital for Bruges to control full access to 
the sea with minimal lordly interference. It managed to assert this control 
over its nearest outport Damme (certainly by the mid fourteenth century) 
but the larger port of Sluis remained a potential threat to its commercial 
interests. From the 1320s tensions escalated. Bruges pressured the count to 
obtain a staple privilege on 4 April 1324 stating that most goods of foreign 
merchants could only be stapled in Bruges. When, in July, John obtained 
the judicial offi  ce of ‘water bailiff ’ in the Zwin , including the right to police 
all traffi  c on the estuary, the Bruges commune reacted immediately: on 31 
July, the urban militia marched on Sluis and burned it to the ground. 66 
 Th ese events coincided with the peasant revolt of 1323– 8 and were the 
direct cause of Bruges’ participation in it. 67 During such revolts townsmen 
and peasants, especially the less affl  uent, could unite in common interest. 
Indeed, the rural communes of the coastal plain of Flanders had similar 
 65  For Bruges, it is impossible to quantify their numbers but in general see Nicholas,  Town and 
Countryside , passim; J. Decavele, ‘De Gentse poorterij en buitenpoorterij’, in Asaert (ed.), 
 Recht en instellingen , pp. 63– 83; and E. Th oen, ‘Rechten en plichten van plattelanders als 
instrumenten van machtspolitieke strijd tussen adel, stedelijke burgerij en grafelijke gezag in 
het laat- middeleeuwse Vlaanderen: Buitenpoorterij en mortemain- rechten ten persoonlijken 
titel in de kasselrijen van Aalst en Oudenaarde, vooral toegepast op de periode rond 1400’, 
in  Machtsstructuren in de plattelandsgemeenschappen in Belgie en aangrenzende gebieden 
(Brussels, 1988), pp. 469– 90. 
 66  Sabbe,  Vlaanderen in Opstand , pp. 19– 20. See further above. 
 67  Ibid., pp. 24– 5. 
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political aspirations to urban communes and similar traditions of popu-
lar meetings and assemblies. Th e internal dynamics of rural assemblies are 
less well documented; but it seems that during mobilizations, captains were 
elected in each rural district. Th e captains also played other roles in pop-
ular politics, for instance in authorizing the local levy of taxes. Th e rural 
communes were led not by the most downtrodden peasants but by the 
more important farmers and those of middling wealth. Th ese were people 
who resisted rising rents and taxes imposed by the local nobility and the 
princely government; and who could also articulate a communal sense of 
politics and aspirations to liberty and self- rule. 68 So it was that farmers and 
peasants could cooperate with urban rebels against landed and commercial 
elites – as they were to do during rebellions in Bruges in 1436 and 1477 . 
However, on other occasions, the interests of countrymen and townsmen 
diverged. Th e men of the Liberty could become incensed by attempts of 
townspeople – guildsmen and merchants – to subject them to the authority 
of the city (though apparently not in 1477, as we will see). Certainly dur-
ing the Artevelde years (1337– 45), Ghent , Ypres and Bruges strove to cre-
ate hinterlands similar to the  contadi surrounding Italian city- states, 69 and 
aroused opposition from country- dwellers:  in 1342 Louis of Nevers had 
to order that any inhabitant of the Liberty who would ‘ring the bell upon 
those of Bruges’, that is, mobilize a popular assembly or riot against the city 
(‘dat niemene clocke of scelle en sla in tVrije up die van Brucghe’), would 
be exiled. 70 
 Th ere were areas of political cooperation between city and Liberty within 
the county of Flanders. Relations between them became more complex in 
the later fourteenth century when the Liberty began to take its place within 
the county’s system of representative assemblies. During the fourteenth 
century representatives from Ghent , Bruges and Ypres began to assemble 
in negotiations with the count over matters of taxation and legislation, and 
became known as the ‘Th ree Members ’ of Flanders, serving as the repre-
sentative body for the county (rather diff erent from the model of the ‘three 
estates’ common in most other European regions). In the later fourteenth 
century, the political elite of the Liberty gained recognition as the ‘Fourth 
Member ’. A  crucial factor in its eventual acceptance, and consolidation 
under the rule of the dukes of Burgundy in Flanders aft er 1384, was the 
economic signifi cance of the castellany, most strikingly manifested in its 
 68  TeBrake,  Plague of Insurrection , pp. 57– 8, 135. 
 69  Boone and Prevenier, ‘City- State Dream’. 
 70  Verbruggen,  Geweld , pp. 103– 4 (1342) and 141 (1380). 
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contribution to subsidies ( aides ) granted to the prince. It was in acting as 
the ‘Fourth Member’ that the Liberty showed a remarkable solidarity with 
the cities, cooperating with or resisting the count as mutual goals shift ed 
and realigned. During the Burgundian epoch, therefore, the issues that 
divided Bruges and the Liberty did not prevent them from presenting a 
unifi ed front when necessary. In fact, Bruges and the Liberty conferred 
almost daily on matters aff ecting their interests, as well as on their relations 
with the other two Members. Bruges and its hinterland had a complex rela-
tionship, which was complicated still further (as we shall see) by relations 
between their elites. 71 
 Th e Burgundian Dukes and the New Balance of Power 
 Th e peace of 1361 solidifi ed constitutional arrangements within the city, 
but was not a permanent solution to political divisions. In 1379 a new revolt 
erupted in Ghent , and the Bruges textile workers soon took sides against 
the elite of their own city. Th e ‘Ghent war ’, lasting until 1385, began as a 
confl ict between the two cities, when Bruges began to dig a canal to link 
itself with the Lys River, having been granted permission to do so by Count 
Louis of Male: this allowed barges carrying grain to bypass Ghent , under-
mining the interests of the Ghent shippers and the grain staple of their 
city. In retaliation, the Ghent urban militia of the ‘White Hoods ’ attacked 
the Bruges canal workers in the village of Sint- Joris- ten- Distel , and Ghent 
rebelled against the count. Th e weavers and some other artisans in Bruges 
and Ypres allied with their ‘brother’ artisans from Ghent . In Bruges, the 
count’s representatives tore up the peace charter of 1361. In February 1380, 
a Bruges alderman was killed in a riot but the pro- comital party reasserted 
control and the rebel textile workers were punished, and were forced to 
swear never to serve in the city government again. In May 1380, following 
 71  W.  Prevenier ,  De leden en de staten van Vlaanderen (1384– 1405) ( Brussels ,  1961 ), pp. 
 41– 5 ;  M.  Boone , ‘ Elites urbaines, noblesse d’état: Bourgeois et nobles dans la société des 
Pays- Bas Bourguignons (principalement en Flandre et en Brabant) ’, in  J.  Paviot (ed.)  Liber 
Amicorum Raphaël De Smedt ( Leuven ,  2001 ), pp.  61 – 85 ;  F.  Buylaert , ‘ Edelen in de Vlaamse 
stedelijke samenleving: Een kwantitatieve benadering van de elite van het laatmiddeleeuwse 
en vroegmoderne Brugge ’,  Tijdschrift  voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis ,  4 ( 2007 ), 
29– 56 (at  56 ) ;  J.  Dumolyn and  F.  Van Tricht , ‘ De sociaal- economische positie van de 
laatmiddeleeuwse Vlaamse adel: Enkele trends ’,  HGG ,  137 ( 2000 ), 3– 46 (at  23 ) ; Dumolyn, 
 Staatsvorming , pp. 148– 50;  W.  Prevenier and  W.  Blockmans ,  Prinsen en poorters: Beelden van 
de laat- middeleeuwse samenleving in de Bourgondische Nederlanden (1384– 1530) ( Antwerp , 
 1998 ), p.  89 . 
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another uprising, the comital party regained the upper hand; and a new 
attempt by the weavers to take power in December also failed. However, the 
count’s partisans were unable to gain enough support among other artisans, 
and the blacksmiths also joined the rebel party in the city. In May 1381, 
forces from Ghent marched on Bruges, and defeated the Bruges city militia 
at the Beverhoutsveld . As the Ghenters occupied their rival city, rebels in 
Bruges cheered them in. On 20 May 1382, a new revolutionary regime was 
installed. However, this came to an end aft er the Battle of Westrozebeke 
(27 November 1382), where the Ghent rebels were defeated by a combined 
French and comital army. Reprisals were crueller than for any previous 
repression of a Bruges rebellion. In 1383 and 1384, 224 rebels (not all from 
Bruges) were executed. In all likelihood the count reinstated the repressive 
privilege of 1329; and even aft er his death in 1384 the guilds were unable to 
recover their power. 72 
 Th e balance of forces between guilds and commercial elites, and between 
city and prince, had begun to change. Th e new count of Flanders, Duke 
Philip the Bold of Burgundy, who succeeded to the county  de juro uxoris as 
husband of Count Louis ’ sole heir, Margaret of Male, began an era of more 
assertive comital rule. Ghent capitulated to him in 1385 (though on advan-
tageous terms), but in Bruges it was not the guilds that emerged victorious, 
but the commercial elites and rentiers: they assumed full power in the city, 
backed by the new dynasty. Th e charter imposed on Bruges by Duke Philip 
on 26 April 1384 included clauses that were anti- communal in nature and 
weakened guild authority in decisive ways:  the policing of the commune 
and the leadership of the militia were transferred to the captains or head-
men of the  poorterie . In eff ect, this eradicated the role of the guilds from the 
body politic, returning the political system to the regime that had existed in 
the 1270s. Th e guilds were stripped of political and military power. Symbols 
of their corporate identity were removed: their banners were seized (on the 
pretext that that this would stop guilds fi ghting each other); and the can-
dles they carried during the annual civic procession of the Holy Blood (see 
 Chapter 8 ) were confi scated. 73 
 72  Demuynck, ‘De Gentse oorlog’;  A.  Holsters , ‘ Moord en politiek tijdens de Gentse opstand, 
1379– 1385 ’,  HMG , new series,  37 ( 1983 ),  89 – 111 ;  M.  Vandermaesen ,  M.  Ryckaert and  M. 
 Coornaert , ‘ De Witte Kaproenen: De Gentse opstand (1379– 1385) en de geschiedenis van de 
Brugse Leie ’,  Kultureel Jaarboek voor de Provincie Oost- Vlaanderen ,  10 ( 1979 ),  9 – 17 . 
 73  De Smet, ‘De repressie te Brugge’; A. Van Oost, ‘Sociale stratifi catie van de Brugse opstandigen 
en van de opstandige ingezetenen van de kleinere kasselrijsteden en van de kasselrijdorpen 
in Vlaanderen van 1379– 1385: Kritische benadering van konfi skatiedokumenten’,  BTFG , 61 
(1978), 830– 77; Espinas and Pirenne (eds.),  Recueil , vol.  i , p. 176; GVS,  Inventaire , vol.  iv , p. 8, 
and see vol.  ii , pp. 467– 71 for a charter issued by this communal government, not mentioning 
9781108419659c06-08_p196-389.indd   295 12/12/2017   12:06:38 PM
296 Jan Dumolyn et al.
296
 For the next twenty- fi ve years, Bruges was run by an oligarchy, mostly 
belonging to rich hosteller families. Th e measures repressing guild power 
were challenged but without success:  in 1387 a ‘revolt, alliance and con-
spiracy’ (‘upset, verband ende vergaderinghe’), a plot by the weaver Jan 
Groeninc to kill the ‘goede lieden’ of the city, was put down. Th e dominance 
of a hostellers’ faction headed by Clais Barbezaen , the son of an immigrant 
from Lucca , and by the Honin family , could not be broken. Another upris-
ing of textile workers failed in 1391 : it showed how the power of the tex-
tile guilds was fading. Riots in 1392 and 1394, caused by divisions between 
city and prince in the wake of the Papal Schism , did not undermine the 
authority of the ruling faction. Further unrest occurred in 1398– 9. In the 
end the faction’s grip on power was loosened not by the guilds but by the 
prince. Duke Philip grew dissatisfi ed with the ruling faction because of its 
unwillingness to support his ambitions at the French court. Th e unrest in 
1398– 9 led to ducal legislation on 26 October 1399 ruling that the appoint-
ment of aldermen could only be made by the princely ‘commissioners of the 
renewal of the law’ (‘commissarissen van wetsvernieuwinghe’), usually high 
ducal offi  cials, oft en including the bailiff  , and important clerics. 74 In the fi rst 
years of the fi ft eenth century, more than in any previous period of Bruges’ 
history, the elites began to turn against one another, their divisions encour-
aged by the machinations of a new and more ambitious prince. 
 In 1407, Duke John the Fearless, Philip ’s successor, supported a coup 
to replace the Barbezaen faction and tighten the Burgundian grip on the 
politics and fi nances of Bruges. Its circumstances refl ected other familiar 
tensions within the city and between Bruges and the Liberty. In that year, 
the men of Bruges refused to allow a comital arbiter to judge on certain dif-
ferences between themselves and the Liberty . Th is was a classic confl ict of 
interest between, on the one hand, the urban working and middle classes, 
who wanted to suppress the rural textile industry , and, on the other, the 
Bruges merchant elites who wished it to continue, since they could ‘put out’ 
textile work to villagers and pay them lower wages. Duke John decided to 
draw up a compromise and to grant the Liberty of Bruges and Sluis some 
minor new rights for the sale and production of cloth. Th e prince clev-
erly used the resulting discontent among the popular classes to arrange a 
coup and to replace the Barbezaen faction with another political clan led by 
the aldermen and emphasizing the freedoms and equality of all burghers; GVS,  Coutume , vol. 
 i , pp. 434– 6. 
 74  GVS,  Inventaire , vol.  iii , p. 233;  J.  Mertens , ‘ Twee (wevers)opstanden te Brugge (1387– 1391) ’, 
 HGG ,  90 ( 1973 ),  5 – 20 ; Van Leeuwen,  De Vlaamse wetsvernieuwing , pp. 142– 53; Van den 
Auweele, ‘Schepenbank’, vol.  ii , pp. 164– 5. 
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the Scutelare family. Th e coup resulted in some advantages for the guilds. 
Th ey were given back their banners, their right to carry candles in the Holy 
Blood procession , and to elect their own wardens . Th e Scutelare family , 
though also hostellers and merchants, were more favourable towards the 
guilds: over the previous century, they had oft en sided with the guilds and 
must have enjoyed some popularity among them. However, the policies of 
the new regime were as disadvantageous to the lower orders as those of the 
preceding one. A charter soon issued by the duke, known as the Calf Skin 
( Calfvel ) decreed that a seventh part of Bruges’ annual revenues was to be 
directly paid to him. In order to fi nance this burden, a ‘cueillote’ was intro-
duced – a new consumption tax on grain that weighed heavily on the mid-
dle and working classes, who were also suff ering from higher grain prices. It 
was soon alleged that the Scutelare faction had promulgated this Calf Skin 
‘without the knowledge of the commune’, and that the guild deans had been 
forced by threats to seal the charter without knowing its contents. 75 
 In October 1411, the Scutelare regime was overthrown by the guilds, 
who reinstated the previous faction and regained many of their privileges 
as a reward. A  dramatic demonstration of re- emerging guild power had 
precipitated this regime change. Th e militia of Bruges, returning from a 
Burgundian expedition against the Armagnac enemies of Duke John in 
Picardy , struck camp on a fi eld just outside Bruges. Th ey refused to put 
down their arms and enter the city unless the Calf Skin were given to them, 
and the tax house demolished with hammers and thrown into the canal. On 
19 October 1411, the Calf Skin was duly handed over to the guild deans . 
Every dean tore off  the seal of his guild and the whole parchment was then 
shredded by the artisans using their teeth. Also at stake during the turbu-
lent years of 1407– 11 were other special privileges possessed by the Bruges 
commune. One highly sensitive issue that touched on the original com-
munal emancipation from servility was the prince’s right to confi scate the 
material goods of burghers. Louis of Nevers had abdicated this right in 
1338. In 1384, Philip the Bold had made an exception to exemptions from 
confi scation for those who rebelled against him; and in 1407, the Calf Skin 
charter stated that those who brought their guild banner to the market- 
place before that of the count would have their goods confi scated. In 1411, 
however, the restrictive measures of 1407 were abolished. 76 
 75  V.  Fris ,  Het Brugsche Calfvel van 1407– 1411 ( Antwerp ,  1911 ); Dumolyn, ‘Une idéologie 
urbaine’. 
 76  Braekevelt et al., ‘Politics of Factional Confl ict’, pp. 24– 5. 
9781108419659c06-08_p196-389.indd   297 12/12/2017   12:06:38 PM
298 Jan Dumolyn et al.
298
 On this issue, the duke gambled and lost. Nevertheless, ducal power 
was in the ascendant. Th e ‘Burgundian state’ was gradually reinforcing the 
power of the central institutions it had created in Flanders: the judicial court 
of the Council of Flanders , which sought to tighten its grip over urban jus-
tice as a court of appeal and by handling cases in the fi rst instance; and the 
Lille - based Chambre des Comptes, which assumed general fi nancial and 
administrative control in the county. Although the Burgundian grip on the 
Bruges elite should not be overstated, within the city notables belonging to 
pro- Burgundian political factions increasingly formed marriage alliances 
and networks with ducal offi  cials and important noblemen. 77 Th us, notwith-
standing guild successes, the events of 1407– 11 principally demonstrated 
the strength of developing ties between the commercial and political elites 
of Bruges and the Burgundian state apparatus. 78 Internal politics in Bruges 
would be increasingly shaped by the rulers’ dynastic interests. Compared 
with the fourteenth- century Flemish counts, the Valois dukes had far more 
resources at their disposal, enjoying the means to discipline urban politics 
and control the oft en dangerous turns these could take when under the infl u-
ence of corporatist ideology. As some elite factions were autonomist, tending 
to side with the guilds, ducal strategy was oft en cleverly tactical rather than 
confrontational. Th us, on 30 September 1414, in a trade- off  for subsidies for 
his campaigns in France , John the Fearless once again granted the privilege 
of non- confi scation and also imposed the  wepelganc . Th is meant that burgo-
masters and treasurers could not be reappointed for two years aft er they had 
left  their offi  ces, while the aldermen, councillors and captains had to wait one 
year. Th is was a concession to the popular classes, but it was also motivated 
by a princely interest in preventing monopolies of power among the Bruges 
elites. However, the new privilege also stated that only native- born Flemings 
who were burghers of Bruges could become members of the city government, 
refl ecting suspicion in Bruges towards a duke keen to install his own cronies 
from outside in urban offi  ces. 79 
 Th e following period, until the 1430s, was relatively peaceful, although 
tensions between Bruges and variously the Liberty of Bruges , Sluis and Ghent 
were rising, and Duke Philip the Good, who succeeded John the Fearless 
in 1419, was augmenting his power and unifying the principalities of the 
 77  J.  Dumolyn , ‘ Nobles, Patricians and Offi  cers: Th e Making of a Regional Political Elite in Late 
Medieval Flanders ’,  Journal of Social History ,  40 ( 2006 ),  431– 52 . 
 78  As illustrated by the case of the Italian Rapondi family: see Lambert,  Th e City . 
 79  GVS,  Coutume , vol.  i , pp. 475– 8; GVS,  Inventaire , vol.  iv , pp. 323– 4. 
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Netherlands. 80 Th e commercial elite continued to dominate the city 
government but the guilds, or at least the guild elites, were not entirely 
excluded from power. Political rule was relatively stable aft er the 1414 
privilege had returned some autonomy to the city government. Th e city 
could still issue its own decrees without the intervention or presence of 
the  schout , a privilege that the Burgundian dukes had not changed. 81 For 
some time, politics remained a matter of compromise between the prince 
and the Flemish urban elites who negotiated with princely central power 
in the assemblies of the Four Members of Flanders . A number of ‘power 
brokers’ also acted as intermediaries between the Burgundian court, 
or state apparatus, and the commercial and fi nancial milieu of Bruges. 
Urban fi nances were subject to the infl uence of fi nanciers with links to 
the duke – oft en fi nanciers of Italian origin, such as Dino Rapondi from 
Lucca . Notable citizens from Bruges like Pieter Bladelin and Pauwels van 
Overtvelt rose to the highest levels of  princely administration, acting on 
behalf of the duke in the city and of the urban elite at court. Th e wealth 
they amassed  – expressed in the purchase of grand residences, luxury 
goods and fashionable artworks – was acquired less as a result of their 
social origins (which lay among the lower segments of the commercial 
class) and more through their service to the prince. 82 Other important 
Bruges families, such as the de Baensts , Adornes and Van Gruuthuses , 
however, combined urban and princely politics without becoming fully 
dependent on the Burgundian dynasty, and looked primarily aft er their 
own interests. 83 
 80  R.  Vaughan ,  John the Fearless: Th e Growth of Burgundian Power ( London ,  1979 ); and  B. 
 Schnerb ,  Jean sans Peur: Le prince meurtrier ( Paris ,  2005 );  R.  Vaughan ,  Philip the Good: Th e 
Apogee of Burgundian Power ( London ,  1970 ). 
 81  GVS,  Coutume , vol.  i , pp. 436– 7. 
 82  De Clercq et al., ‘Vivre Noblement’;  M.  Boone , ‘ Un grand commis de l’État burgundo- 
habsbourgeois face à la mort: Le testament et la sépulture de Pierre Lanchals (Bruges, 1488) ’, 
in  F.  Daelemans and  A.  Kelders (eds.),  Miscellanea in memoriam Pierre Cockshaw (1938– 
2008): Aspects de la vie culturelle dans les Pays- Bas Méridionaux (XIVe– XVIIIe siècle) , 2 vols. 
( Brussels ,  2009 ), vol.  i , pp.  63 – 88 . 
 83  F.  Buylaert and  J.  Dumolyn , ‘ L’importance sociale, politique et culturelle de la haute 
noblesse dans les pays bourguignons et habsbourgeois (1475– 1525): Un état de la question ’, 
in  J.  Haemers ,  C.  Van Hoorebeeck and  H.  Wijsman (eds.),  Entre la ville, la noblesse et 
l’État: Philippe de Clèves (1456– 1528), homme politique et bibliophile , Burgundica 13 
( Turnhout ,  2007 ), pp.  279– 94 ; and  F.  Buylaert , ‘ Sociale mobiliteit bij stedelijke elites in 
laatmiddeleeuws Vlaanderen: Een gevalstudie over de Vlaamse familie De Baenst ,’  Jaarboek 
voor Middeleeuwse Geschiedenis ,  8 ( 2005 ),  201– 51 . 
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 Criminal Justice during the Fift eenth Century 
 In a medieval city, politics and justice were two sides of the same coin. 
During the fi ft eenth century (when sources for the administration of jus-
tice become more abundant), the exercise of criminal justice in Bruges 
refl ected the growing impact on society of public power, both urban and 
princely. Princely power especially under the Burgundians was eventually 
to prevail, but its extension over criminal justice was not a straightforward 
or linear process. As with urban politics, the administration of criminal 
justice was a joint aff air (as shown above) between the town government 
and the  schout , the comital sheriff  and public prosecutor. Since the begin-
ning of the urban commune in its legally recognized form, criminal justice 
had occupied the larger part of any privilege Bruges obtained, as was also 
the case for other cities. Communal space had to be one of ‘peace’ and 
security in order to guarantee the well- being of city- dwellers and a sound 
climate for investment, and during the later Middle Ages, public authority 
was to strengthen. 
 Th e criminal justice system in Bruges, as elsewhere in Flanders, had 
both public and private aspects. Th e public dimension of criminal law 
became dominant from the twelft h century onwards in conjunction with 
the centralization of comital power. We have seen above that the char-
ters issued by the counts, starting with the Great Charter of Philip of 
Alsace from 1165– 77, and later adapted in 1281, 1304, 1329, 1338 and 
1384, constituted the legal basis for the prosecution and the punish-
ment of criminal off ences, particularly acts of violence labelled illegal 
by the counts. Th e creation of an urban ‘bench’ of aldermen that acted 
as a panel of judges on the count’s behalf, and of a comital offi  cer, the 
bailiff  , who acted as a public prosecutor, along with the burgomaster of 
the commune, and as the executor of criminal sentences involving fi nes, 
corporal punishment or the death penalty, set the organizational frame-
work for the local criminal justice system. Th e older privileges of 1281 
and 1304 had been preoccupied with preventing feuds between warring 
families. By that time, the last remnants of ‘irrational’ methods of proof 
such as the judicial duel were abolished and replaced by testimonies of 
witnesses and an inquisitorial procedure (which included the use of tor-
ture). Outside the ecclesiastical courts, imprisonment was never used 
as a punishment; only those awaiting their trial, or who could not pay 
off  debts, were incarcerated in the  Ghiselhuus and later in the  Steen as 
the urban prison. Th e usual communal punishments were exile, forced 
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pilgrimages, execution, mutilations and shaming punishments but also 
a great many fi nes. 84 
 Th e sustainable settlement of violent confl icts among citizens and 
between families, clans, factions or corporations could not be achieved, 
however, by the mere punishment of criminal acts. Th e pacifi cation of those 
confl icts by (private) arrangements between off enders and victims was 
equally important in order to recognize the rights of all parties involved and 
to restore the social equilibrium. Bruges had no reconciliation court sepa-
rate from the criminal court, in contrast to Ghent (which was unique in the 
county in this respect). Admittedly, the panels of partitioners ( deelmannen 
or  partiseurs ), which were lower courts subordinate to the aldermen, were 
given the competence of peace makers ( paisierders ) in 1305. Th ese panels 
numbered six – one for each of the city sections – until 1525, when they 
merged into a single panel for the whole city. But their power was limited, 
by statute, to imposing legal ‘truces’ which were (in theory) only tempo-
rary cessations of hostilities, and which did not include ‘reconciliations’ (or 
sustainable commitments of friendship). Th e Bruges aldermen, who con-
stituted a single bench together with the councillors, dealt with criminal 
aff airs both in criminal trials, where they acted as a panel of judges, and in 
reconciliation cases, where they simply acted as a panel of notaries. A rec-
onciliation procedure between off enders and victims was conducted largely 
outside the courtroom, because it was seen essentially as a private lawsuit 
that did not off er a valid legal alternative for a criminal procedure (a rule 
which, exceptionally again, did not operate in Ghent ). However, a success-
ful reconciliation could – and oft en did – interfere with the criminal pro-
cedure, as it could serve as a motive for the public prosecutor, the bailiff  , to 
drop the charge in exchange for the payment of a composition. 85 
 Th e procedure of ‘composing’ ( composeren or  verdingen in Dutch ) by the 
bailiff  was oft en applied in the resolution of criminal cases during the four-
teenth and fi ft eenth centuries, as evidenced by the Bruges sheriff  accounts . 
Most criminal off ences were eligible for composition, though some crimes, 
for instance homicide , could not be ‘composed’ without prior advice from 
a higher- ranking comital offi  cer or court (the bailiff  sovereign, the receiver 
general, the comital Chamber of Accounts , the Council of Flanders or 
an individual master of accounts or comital councillor ). Only the most 
 84  Van Caenegem,  Geschiedenis van het strafrecht , passim; Van Caenegem,  Geschiedenis van het 
strafprocesrecht , passim. 
 85  Van Rompaey,  Het grafelijk baljuwsambt ;  J.  Van Rompaey , ‘ Het compositierecht in Vlaanderen 
van de veertiende tot de achttiende eeuw ’,  Tijdschrift  voor Rechtsgeschiedenis ,  29 ( 1961 ),  43 – 79 . 
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serious crimes, including murder , armed robbery or  lèse- majesté , were 
excluded from composition. Initially, the compositions concluded by the 
Bruges sheriff  concerned in the fi rst place acts of violence, punishable by 
fi xed fi nes (of 3 pounds, 11  † pounds or 60 pounds parisis ), as listed in 
the comital charters, including physical assault , threats with weapons , and 
complicity to homicide . Th e second most important category of ‘composed’ 
off ences included those linked to the organizing or facilitating of prostitu-
tion (brothel keeping or ownership, fi ned respectively with 3 pounds and 
10 pounds parisis). From the late 1430s on, the formerly minor category of 
‘various off ences’ (‘diverses calaenges et aventures in French’ , the language 
of the Burgundian administration normally used in the sheriff  accounts) 
increased exponentially, thus widening dramatically the range of criminal 
cases (including economic and property crimes ) that were resolved by a 
composition with the sheriff  . 
 It is important to note that composition, as a legal term and technique, 
designated not only the fi nancial arrangement with the bailiff  or sheriff  in 
his capacity as the public prosecutor on behalf of the count in order to buy 
off  prosecution (thus avoiding trial), but also the partial cancellation (or 
remission) of the criminal fi nes imposed by the aldermen, or more exactly, 
of the comital part of the revenues of those fi nes, by the same sheriff , but in 
his capacity as an executor of the court’s criminal sentences. In both cases, 
by making use of his jurisdictional power to compose with an accused or 
convicted off ender, the sheriff  played an important role in the exercise of 
both criminal justice and the right of pardon. Th is was especially true for 
the charges of violent crimes punishable with the huge fi ne of 60 pounds 
(the equivalent of 120 days’ wages of a skilled labourer in fi ft eenth- century 
Bruges), which were in 99 per cent of all 2759 cases between 1385 and 1550 
composed by the sheriff  , either before or aft er trial. Also the much lower, 
but still substantial, fi ne of eleven and a half pounds was in 83 per cent of 
the cases (numbering 1469 in total) not entirely composed by the comital 
offi  cer. For the fourteenth and fi ft eenth centuries, we are ignorant about 
the ratio between the number of criminal charges that resulted in a pre- 
trial composition with the sheriff  and those that led to an actual conviction 
by the aldermen. No registers of criminal sentences by the  vierschaar , the 
main chamber of the aldermen’s court for criminal cases, survive before 
1520 (except the register for 1491– 2, fi lled mainly with charges of rebellion 
following the Flemish Revolt ). Until 1530, the sheriff  accounts give no clue 
either as to whether the fi nancial arrangements occurred before or aft er 
trial. In the period 1530– 50, around 70 per cent of all charges of violent 
crimes punishable with fi nes of 60 pounds or 11  † pounds resulted in a 
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pre- trial composition, and about 30 per cent in a post- trial composition 
(or partial cancellation). Besides, post- trial composition was not the exclu-
sive province of the sheriff . Th e burgomasters , particularly the burgomaster 
of the commune, had the same power to compose a fi ne – or more exactly, 
the city’s part in the revenues of a fi ne – imposed by the court of aldermen. 
By 1480 the treasurers had taken over that competence from the burgo-
masters. Th e power to compose  before trial, however, was reserved to the 
sheriff   only. 
 Whether composition by the sheriff  had a positive or negative eff ect 
on the fairness and quality of the criminal justice system in late medie-
val Bruges is hard to decide. It is true that the sheriff  could abuse the right 
of composition for personal gain, by forcing alleged suspects into accept-
ing a composition on his terms, or by siphoning off  a part of the composi-
tions’ revenues. Th e sheriff  did indeed embezzle the revenues of 25 to 50 
per cent of all compositions he concluded, either by not registering them 
or by booking a lower sum than he actually received. Aft er all, the sher-
iff  of Bruges received no salary (unlike most other comital bailiff s ), which 
compelled him to generate his own revenues. For a long time, the central 
authorities did not have the power or the will to clean up the sheriff ’s fi nan-
cial administration. Th e only eff ective way to change this proved to be the 
farming out of the offi  ce of sheriff  , which began to occur from 1469. But 
leaving aside the risks of abuse, composition was nevertheless a means to 
add fl exibility and leniency to the rigid system of fi xed fi nes by taking into 
account the distinct elements of every case and the fi nancial means of every 
suspect. Composition allowed for a more balanced judgement of an off ence 
or crime, especially in those cases where the judging panel had no discre-
tionary power, and it encouraged off ender– victim reconciliation. It was a 
pragmatic solution for justice to be applied in cases where either a lack of 
evidence or legal means of coercion to bring the suspect before the court 
jeopardized the chance of conviction. From 1385 until 1485 the number 
of charges that resulted in a fi ne imposed by the aldermen or a compo-
sition concluded by the sheriff  fl uctuated around a yearly average of 93, 
with peaks in the 1390s and 1440s (yearly averaging 120– 5) alternating with 
troughs in the 1410s (yearly averaging 60) and 1460s (yearly averaging 75). 
 In the long run, fi nes and compositions declined in number. By the 
1530s – no information survives for 1495– 1530 – the yearly average had 
shrunk to 22, and one decade later to 11. Th e amounts paid slowly declined 
too. In the late fourteenth century, a violent crime punishable with the fi ne 
of 60 pounds was composed for an average of 30 pounds; by the end of the 
fi ft eenth century, the average suspect of that type of crime paid in reality no 
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more than 5 pounds. Th is amounts to saying that the late medieval crimi-
nal justice system was oriented towards the private settlement of off ences 
through reconciliation and its concomitants, composition with the sheriff , 
and towards fi nancial punishment; but that by the mid sixteenth century 
this system had collapsed. From 1465 onwards, as the central Burgundian 
state grew stronger, a new, ‘early modern’ system of criminal justice, based 
on public humiliation, corporal punishment, and banishment outside the 
county, had begun to take its place. Th e number of sentences to the pil-
lory, whipping and/ or mutilation doubled from a yearly average of 7 in the 
period 1385– 65 to 13.5 in the period 1465– 1500. In the fi rst half of the six-
teenth century this yearly average doubled again to 26. At the same time, 
the traditional focus of the criminal justice policy on violent crimes shift ed 
towards property crimes , vagrancy and begging, as evidenced by commu-
nal and princely ordinances (from 1496 onwards), the expenses for execu-
tions in the sheriff  accounts and the sentence registers of the aldermen. 86 
 Politics at the End of the Middle Ages 
 Relative political stability aft er 1414 came to an end in the 1430s. An unfa-
vourable commercial climate and tensions between Bruges and the Liberty 
and between Bruges and its unruly outport Sluis were the primary causes of 
a large- scale uprising in 1436– 8. It started with a strike – what a Burgundian 
charter called a ‘ledichganc’ (a going idle) – by the urban militia. As in 1411, 
the militiamen were returning aft er a campaign in the service of the prince, 
in this case a failed attempt to besiege Calais in support of Duke Philip the 
Good’s war with England . Once back in Bruges, the guildsmen refused to 
start work. Th e familiar pattern of mobilization for collective action then 
followed. On 19 October 1436 the Belfry bell was rung and a crowd gath-
ered before it on the Market Square. Th e rebel government proclaimed its 
ordinances before the urban community, liberating from banishment those 
who had been exiled for petty crimes by the former, unpopular, sheriff  and 
allowing all men of the Liberty of Bruges to become burghers of the city. All 
 86  G.  Dupont , ‘ Le temps des compositions: Pratiques judiciaires à Bruges et à Gand du XIVe 
au XVIe siècle (Partie I) ’, in  B.  Dauven and  X.  Rousseaux (eds.),  Préférant miséricorde à 
rigueur de justice: Pratiques de la grâce (XIIIe– XVIIe siècles): Actes de la journée d’études de 
Louvain- la- Neuve, 15 octobre 2007 ( Louvain- la- Neuve ,  2012 ), pp.  53 – 95 ;  G.  Dupont , ‘ Le temps 
des compositions: Pratiques judiciaires à Bruges et à Gand du XIVe au XVIe siècle (Partie 
II) ’, in  M.- A.  Bourguignon ,  B.  Dauven and  X.  Rousseaux (eds.),  Amender, sanctionner et 
punir: Histoire de la peine du Moyen Âge au XXe siècle: Actes des journées d’études de Louvain- 
la- Neuve, 19– 20 octobre 2009 ( Louvain- la- Neuve ,  2012 ), pp.  15 – 47 . 
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those who had been in the city government within the last thirty years were 
ordered to come to the Market Square to justify why the privileges had not 
been respected. Th e crisis escalated as the elite fl ed the town, but burgomas-
ter Morissis van Varsenare was caught and lynched. As in 1323– 8, the eff ects 
of the revolt reverberated around the countryside and in the smaller towns 
of western Flanders. In 1437 the militia laid siege to Sluis , although failed to 
destroy the town as it had done in 1323. Another familiar pattern of rebel-
lion also emerged. Once again, the city was ruled by a wider cross- section of 
society, in which guild power was prominent. During the two years of revolt , 
authority was exercised through a Great Council : all guildsmen and captains 
of the six sections, bound together by sworn oath, ruled the city, thus in prac-
tice restricting the power of the aldermen, and in theory opening up political 
decision- making to the rank- and- fi le of all guilds. Th e ideal of ‘the commune’, 
as a wider community of all burghers and guilds, had triumphed again. 87 
 Triumph was fl eeting. An economic blockade imposed by Duke Philip 
the Good, lack of support from Ghent and eventual exhaustion among 
the rebels, caused the revolt to fail. In 1438 a harsh repression followed, 
including the imposition of a massive fi ne on the city, and the execution of 
some forty ringleaders of the rising. A punitive charter issued at Arras on 4 
March 1438 granted greater autonomy for Sluis from Bruges, and prohib-
ited so- called ‘bad customs’ in the city, including any form of strike. Th e 
Liberty of Bruges also emerged from the rebellion with greater prestige: it 
had already been formally recognized as the Fourth Member of Flanders 
by Duke Philip in 1437. Further misery was visited on Bruges with plague 
and famine between 1439 and 1441. Between 1441 and 1445, all the guild 
statutes were systematically revised by the duke and the urban elite, though 
Philip did not make the mistake of stripping the guilds entirely of their 
power, which would have provoked fresh revolts. 88 
 By the 1440s, then, it seemed that the age- long struggle of the guilds 
(and their allies among the elites) to maintain or restore the communal 
privileges of Bruges had been dealt a fatal blow by their opponents. Chief 
among these, by this time, were the elite groups in Bruges society who had 
begun to hitch their ambitions to the coat- tails of Burgundian power or 
simply to enjoy relative stability and economic prosperity that character-
ized the second half of Philip the Good’s reign. 89 Ducal authority, and its 
 87  Dumolyn,  De Brugse opstand ;  J.  Dumolyn , ‘ Th e “Terrible Wednesday” of 
Pentecost: Confronting Urban and Princely Discourses in the Bruges Rebellion of 1436– 1438 ’, 
 History: Journal of the Historical Association ,  92 ( 2007 ),  3 – 20 . 
 88  GVS,  Inventaire , vol.  v , pp. 151– 4. 
 89  See above,  Chapter 6 . 
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state apparatus, were in the ascendant. By 1440 Duke Philip had at his dis-
posal more men and fi nances than any of his comital predecessors and he 
was a major player on the European political scene. Th e path was open to 
pursue more centralizing measures to reduce the autonomy of the city and 
to reinforce the strength of oligarchic groups within it in relation to the 
guilds. Philip did not remove the remaining privileges of the city entirely; 
even so, several were eroded. For instance, appeal against verdicts of the 
aldermen in civil cases with the Council of Flanders , the provincial comital 
court of law, became a general phenomenon from the 1450s. Such was the 
strength and success of Burgundian rule that for almost forty years aft er 
1438, no new revolts broke out in the city. Even during the major Ghent 
Revolt of 1449– 53, there were no real troubles in Bruges. Some chroniclers 
suggest that the Ghent rebels had their supporters in the city, but power-
ful representatives of the Burgundian government such as the nobleman 
Lodewijk van Gruuthuse and the fi nancier Pieter Bladelin , with the help of 
other elite groups, kept Bruges fi rmly in line. 90 
 Th is political stability is also explained by favourable economic condi-
tions between c.1445 and c.1475 that ushered in the classic ‘Burgundian’ 
high point of medieval Bruges, when living standards for middling groups 
were at their peak (see  Chapter 6 ). Yet the relative urban prosperity did not 
necessarily make for greater social equality. Inequalities became especially 
visible in the mechanisms used to fi nance the city government. As in most 
other medieval cities, urban taxation was dependent on indirect taxing of 
daily necessities, especially of beer, wine and grain: at least 60 per cent of 
the city’s income in the fi ft eenth century came from this regressive system 
that was by its nature socially unjust. In addition, the wealthy were able to 
purchase the farms of these forms of taxation. Only during times of fi nan-
cial hardship were the wealthiest groups asked for voluntary loans to the 
city. Th e burden on the lower and middle classes was made heavier still by 
the cost of annuities that had to be paid out of city income: the city fi nances 
also depended on selling life and heritable annuities and the selling of these 
began to spiral from the mid fi ft eenth century onwards. Some annuities 
were sold to artisans, but it was mostly the upper classes, including the for-
eign merchants, who invested in them. Th erefore, wealthier groups profi ted 
thrice over from this fi nancial system: they were made to pay less taxation 
than others relative to income, they farmed the various forms of the indirect 
tax system, and they were the city’s principal creditors. Th e same groups 
 90  J.  Haemers ,  De Gentse opstand (1449 – 1453): De strijd tussen rivaliserende netwerken om het 
stedelijke kapitaal ( Kortrijk ,  2004 ), p.  302 . 
9781108419659c06-08_p196-389.indd   306 12/12/2017   12:06:38 PM
307Political Power and Social Groups, c.1300–c.1500
307
formed part of the elite who ran or had close connections with the urban 
government. Th us, the intermingling of the city’s fi scal income and the pub-
lic debt strengthened the political position of a small group of investors. 91 
 During the reign of Charles the Bold (1467– 77), the commercial elite 
and rentiers were still dominant in Bruges. Fiscal pressure was mounting 
and this caused growing discontent among the popular classes who paid 
the bulk of taxes. Moreover, on average, a third of taxation raised in Bruges 
was transferred to the treasury of Duke Charles . In the accounting year of 
1475/ 6, a record of 83 per cent of urban revenues was directed towards his 
wars and the repayment of annuities and debts. In August 1475, under the 
pretext of budget cuts, the Bruges political elite composed an ordinance, 
ratifi ed by the duke, declaring that the aldermen would no longer receive 
salaries. Th e eff ect was to make the city government even more oligar-
chic (and the artisans would revoke this law when they revolted in 1477). 
Prosopographical study of city government offi  ces in this period demon-
strates how few of them were in the hands of guild representatives. Th e 
 poorters occupied about 22 per cent of the magistracy; the hostellers and 
brokers made up almost 20 per cent of the burgomasters , councillors and 
aldermen, while the butchers and fi shmongers fi lled another 10 per cent of 
all municipal offi  ces. Th e textile guilds, however, contributed 2.5 per cent 
and the various small guilds a mere 12 per cent. Th e remaining 33 per cent 
are more diffi  cult to identify: they would have included some guildsmen, 
but probably also many  poorters , who are oft en more diffi  cult to identify 
than artisans in terms of their professions. 92 Th ese inequities were very 
likely a cause of tension; and the city was suff ering from the growing fi nan-
cial demands of the princely government while economic conditions were 
worsening. 93 Th e crisis point came in 1477 aft er the death of Duke Charles 
at the Battle of Nancy : it precipitated a period of internecine civil war that 
touched the whole of Flanders, and other parts of the Netherlands. Once 
again the guilds asserted their power and political aspirations. An alliance 
of rebels in Ghent , Bruges and Ypres took advantage of the weakness of 
Charles’ heir, the young Countess Mary of Burgundy , to win back their 
former privileges and political position. 94 
 91  Haemers,  For the Common Good , pp. 152– 3, 195– 9;  L.  Derycke , ‘ Th e Public Annuity Market 
in Bruges at the End of the 15th Century ’, in  M.  Boone ,  K.  Davids and  P.  Janssens (eds.),  Urban 
Public Debts: Urban Government and the Market for Annuities in Western Europe (14th– 18th 
Centuries) ( Turnhout ,  2003 ), pp.  165– 81 . 
 92  Mattheus, ‘Prosopografi e’, vol.  i , p. 20. 
 93  Haemers,  For the Common Good , pp. 146– 7. 
 94  J.  Haemers ,  De strijd om het regentschap over Filips de Schone: Opstand, facties en geweld in 
Brugge, Gent en Ieper (1482– 1488 ) ( Ghent ,  2015 ). 
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 The Bruges craft guilds mobilized in 1477 following the customary 
pattern of popular politics, breaking into the Belfry to examine the city’s 
privileges, assembling and arming themselves in their guild houses , 
raising their banners there, drawing up a petition in the Great Council , 
and assembling in a  wapeninghe (armed gathering) through a  roepinghe 
(call for action). Much of their programme was a traditional communal 
one: demanding the removal of obstacles to trade and industry such as 
tolls and market restrictions, the restoration of guild political and mil-
itary rights, the ratification of urban privileges, the eradication of cor-
ruption among the political elites, the introduction of high standards 
of justice, and the elevation of the representatives of the commune, the 
deans and captains, to a position of greater power. The 1438 charter 
of Arras was ritually destroyed by the Bruges nobleman and princely 
councillor Lodewijk van Gruuthuse as a concession to the rebels. On 
30 March 1477, Mary of Burgundy granted Bruges a new privilege. The 
old election system was restored:  nine out of every thirteen members 
of the ‘bench’ of aldermen and the councillors were to be elected by the 
eight Members of the guilds and the remaining four by the Member 
of the  poorterie . The rebels also sought to weaken the privileges of the 
Liberty of Bruges: the Liberty was to lose its position as Fourth Member 
of Flanders, and any mention of the Fourth Member was to be removed 
from every copy of the General Privilege for Flanders which had been 
issued on 11 February that year. The political and judicial administra-
tion of the castellany was reorganized and on many points made subor-
dinate to Bruges. The years 1477– 85 and 1488– 90 were to be the only 
periods, from the early eleventh century when the castellany was set 
up until 1795 when it was abolished, that the Liberty was de facto (if 
not quite de jure) subordinate to the city. The Bruges militia was also 
strengthened: the peasants of the Liberty joined the communal army of 
the city, while the militia of the Red Hoods , counting 100 men, was also 
re- established. 95 
 As in the past, though, these victories for the guilds were achieved in 
coalition with certain members of elite groups, and in opposition to oth-
ers. The guilds were allied with a faction led by the wealthy spice mer-
chant Willem Moreel against another party favourable to the princely 
dynasty. The Moreel faction survived the death of Mary of Burgundy in 
1482, when her husband, the Habsburg Maximilian of Austria, assumed 
 95  Haemers,  For the Common Good , passim. 
9781108419659c06-08_p196-389.indd   308 12/12/2017   12:06:38 PM
309Political Power and Social Groups, c.1300–c.1500
309
power in Flanders as the guardian of their son Philip . Considered an 
unjust and illegitimate prince, Maximilian found his rule strongly con-
tested by most of his Flemish subjects, including some Flemish nobles. 
Regime changes in different Flemish cities began to occur. In 1485, the 
Moreel faction was overthrown; and even though the privileges won in 
1477 remained in place, the new faction loyal to Maximilian imposed a 
reign of harsh repression on the city under the leadership of the sheriff 
Pieter Lanchals . After 1485 the guilds were no longer represented in the 
city government. 
 Early in 1488, however, a vigorous revolt erupted in Bruges while 
Maximilian was in the city. Th e guildsmen once again occupied the 
market- place, and installed a new magistracy. Famously, they impris-
oned Maximilian himself. Reprisals were visited on members of the old 
regime: the hated Pieter Lanchals was hunted down and executed. His head 
was attached to the Ghent gate . Aft er fi ve months, the humiliated Habsburg 
prince was released aft er he had sworn to restore all Bruges’ privileges. 
Unsurprisingly he did not keep his word, and waged war on the city: Bruges 
was fi nally subdued at the beginning of 1490. In the summer of that year, a 
fi nal uprising took place when the Bruges rebels allied with the nobleman 
Philip of Cleves who was resisting Maximilian’s authority from Sluis and 
other strongholds, and with Lodewijk van Gruuthuse ; but on 6 December 
1490 the ‘peace of Damme’ was sealed and the city fi nally submitted to the 
Habsburg dynasty. Th e provisions of the 1438 charter of Arras were rein-
stated and the privileges of 1477, including those regarding the Liberty , lost 
all legal authority. 
 Th e guilds would never completely lose their social and political power, 
but from then on, and throughout the sixteenth century, they were to be 
cowed by a political system that was elitist and oligarchic, ruled by local 
merchants, jurists and nobles who were usually more unconditional in their 
loyalty to the Habsburg rulers of Flanders than their predecessors had been. 
Aft er 1490 there were to be no more major social and political upheavals in 
Bruges until iconoclasm broke out in 1566, and even in that period Bruges 
would remain a relatively stable city. 96 
 96  Haemers,  For the Common Good , pp. 156– 73;  R.  Wellens , ‘ La révolte brugeoise de 1488 ’, 
 HGG ,  102 ( 1965 ),  5 – 52 ;  J.  van Leeuwen , ‘ Rebels, Texts and Triumph: Th e Use of Written 
Documents during the Revolt of 1477 in Bruges ’, in  P.  Schulte ,  M.  Mostert and  I.  van 
Renswoude (eds.),  Strategies of Writing: Studies on Text and Trust in the Middle Ages 
( Turnhout ,  2008 ), pp. 301– 22 (at  313 ) ; Van Uytven, ‘Stages of Economic Decline’; GVS, 
 Inventaire , vol.  v , pp. 121– 38, 146– 52, 297– 8. 
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 Th e Bruges Political Elite 
 Th e previous discussion has outlined a political and institutional history of 
Bruges in which an underlying dynamic was the debate and confl ict over 
the corporate nature of the city. Th e guilds were oft en the institutions at 
the forefront of agitation for more popular representation, while members 
of the ‘commercial elites’, increasingly allied to princely authority, acted to 
check guild power. But it is quite apparent that political confl icts were never 
a straightforward contest between guilds and so- called ‘elites’, or between 
‘lower’ and ‘upper classes’. Th ere was also a complex institutional entwin-
ing of the urban magistracy with the craft  guilds. To off er a more balanced 
approach to politics in later medieval Bruges, some further questions need 
to be addressed: who exactly were the ‘commercial elites’ and ‘guildsmen’? 
Who became members of the urban magistracy and why? 
 Th e diffi  culty with answering these questions partly stems from diffi  cul-
ties with terminology. For a start, we have only used the notion of ‘patri-
cians’ as a term of convenience; in fact, it is an anachronism that ill fi ts 
the situation in Bruges. Th ose who became aldermen and councillors were 
hardly a homogeneous group with legal prerogatives akin to those of the 
senatorial families of the Roman republic , to whom the term ‘patricians’ 
was fi rst applied. Surviving evidence is suffi  ciently rich to show that in the 
thirteenth century the Bruges magistracy in control of the judicial system 
and city fi nances was dominated by a relatively small number of families; 
but the members of this group undoubtedly had a mixed background, 
ranging from successful merchants living in the city’s oldest commercial 
district to rural landowners and  milites who were attracted by the oppor-
tunities off ered by the burgeoning urban economy. 97 Th e early presence of 
such lordly landowners can be deduced from Marcus Gerards’ 1562 map 
of Bruges: it shows, within the city area enclosed by the second line of city 
ramparts (begun in 1297), what appear to be several fortifi ed houses and 
moated sites. Perhaps some of these landowners had not initially been inter-
ested in commerce or urban fi nance, but found their properties gradually 
absorbed into the expanding space occupied by the city. Moreover, owning 
landed property outside the city limits had become a defi ning characteristic 
of the Flemish urban elites from the thirteenth century onwards. Studies of 
the Bruges elite family of de Vos , for instance, have shown that it continued 
to invest heavily in the countryside for centuries. Th e same family also took 
 97  See the general discussion in  A. B.  Hibbert , ‘ Th e Origins of the Medieval Town Patriciate ’,  Past 
and Present ,  3 ( 1953 ),  15 – 27 . 
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up several comital offi  ces, illustrating that a certain number of elite Bruges 
lineages had an active interest in serving the prince even before Burgundian 
power made this an ever more appealing career path. 98 
 At the turn of the fourteenth century, as we have seen, the traditional 
power of the merchant class and aldermanic families was challenged by the 
craft  guilds, and the social make- up of the magistracy and the  poorterie 
became more complex. A number of the traditional ruling families of the 
twelft h and thirteenth centuries certainly continued to participate in the 
city council: some had joined the party of the guilds; others returned during 
the years of reaction aft er 1309. Many of the representatives of the  poor-
terie still came from the same families who had belonged to the thirteenth- 
century political elite. Nevertheless, many others were ‘new men’. During 
the fourteenth and fi ft eenth centuries, the  poorterie , as a ‘Member’ in 
the new constitution, constituted around 20 per cent of city inhabitants. 
Evidence from the early fi ft eenth century shows that when the Bruges mili-
tia was in the fi eld, roughly 20 per cent of the monthly expenses went to 
the  poorterie . 99 Even if we concede that a member of the  poorterie may have 
received a higher monthly stipend then a fellow combatant from the craft  
guilds (especially as some wealthy merchants fought as fully armoured 
horsemen, requiring higher outlays) it is clear that the  poorterie was a much 
larger group than the handful of families who had once dominated the 
Bruges city council. Moreover, not all of them were rich merchants engaged 
in international commerce, for the  poorterie also represented the  poorter-
sneringen or ‘burgher trades’ which were not organized in formal guilds 
(such as landlords of wine taverns, bonnet makers and a number of other 
specialized professions mostly in the smaller retailing sector). Other  poort-
ers were merchants involved in local or regional trade; still others came 
from professions like jurists or schoolmasters who enjoyed some prestige 
but who could be relatively poor. In fact, the social make- up of the Bruges 
magistracy can be quite diffi  cult to categorize even with detailed prosopo-
graphical study. For instance, some families and individuals who served 
in the urban magistracy did not consistently take up offi  ce via the same 
route: in one year they can appear to serve as members of the  poorterie and 
in another they are listed as hostellers , serving as members of the brokers’ 
 98  C.  D’Hooghe and  E.  Balthau , ‘ Een bijdrage tot de studie van het stadspatriciaat in de late 
middeleeuwen: De Brugse familie De Vos in de 14 de – 15 de eeuw ’,  Castellum ,  5 ( 1988 ), 4– 81 
(at  4– 36 ). 
 99  Th is fi gure tallies with an older estimate that the commercial elite of mid- fourteenth- century 
Bruges comprised about 20 per cent of the population: Dumolyn,  De Brugse opstand , pp. 57– 8; 
Prevenier, ‘Bevolkingscijfers’. 
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guild . And as we have noted, certain kinds of guildsmen, while representing 
their guilds in city government, shared the same social milieu and political 
outlook as  poorters : butchers , fi shermen , stone masons and carpenters were 
wealthy contractors, while many members from the luxury trades such as 
goldsmiths or furriers were well off . Th us, it is diffi  cult to determine the 
precise social standing of the members of the city council and draw up clear 
statistics. 
 Moreover, not all richer merchants aspired to political offi  ce. For instance, 
Wouter Ameyde (see  Chapter 6 ) was a typical representative of the Bruges 
commercial elite at the end of the Middle Ages. He combined the trades of 
broker , international banker and entrepreneur in the textile industry and 
he was also active as a merchant in wool, cloth and dyeing materials. His 
business network included Spanish and Italian merchants, Bruges money 
changers, merchants of Ghent and Lille and drapers of the smaller Flemish 
textile towns of Kortrijk , Menen , Hondschoote and Harelbeke . 100 On the 
political level, however, the Ameyde family would never rise to great prom-
inence. In other words, the holding of political power, aft er 1300, was not 
a necessary constituent of social prestige. Contemporaries had no clear- 
cut social criteria for determining access to exclusive groups of men ded-
icated to the direct wielding of political power as aldermen, treasurers or 
headmen . However, this does not mean that certain cliques were unable 
to establish their power in urban government over long periods, or that 
the inhabitants of late medieval Bruges were unaware of their existence. 
Prosopographical research shows the continuing dominance, within all 
kinds of regime in the late medieval period, of a number of great hostellers’ 
families, such as Honin , Bonin , Metteneye , Van der Beurze , Van de Walle 
or Scutelare . 101 Indeed, there were networks in Bruges fully geared to the 
accumulation of an inordinate amount of status and power. Th is may be 
illustrated with the example of the Metteneye family , who were active in 
hostelling and international commerce, and who provided no fewer than 
108 aldermen and councillors between 1351 and 1500. 
 Th e genealogical reconstruction of this prominent family is tentative but 
revealing:  it shows that, among the elites, marriage was not only shaped 
by individual preferences, but also  – and perhaps primarily  – by collec-
tive concerns. All the marriage partners of this family originated from the 
top layers of Flemish society, belonging either to noble lineages (marked in 
black in  Table 7.1 ) or to the world of hostellers , wealthy merchants, rentiers 
 100  Stabel, ‘Entre commerce’, pp. 75– 90; Verbist, ‘Traditie’. 
 101  Dumolyn,  De Brugse opstand , pp. 105– 20. 
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and large landowners. Furthermore, this marriage network was closely tied 
to the wielding of urban political power. Of the twenty- six known families 
who provided a marriage partner to the Metteneye family , no fewer than 
nineteen had provided at least one alderman or councillor to the Bruges 
magistracy (underlined in  Table  7.1 ). Marriage functioned as part of an 
overarching strategy to preserve and expand the family’s fortune and politi-
cal infl uence, a function best illustrated in the alliance of the brothers Jacob 
and Jan Metteneye , in the later fourteenth century, with women from the 
Breydel family , which owned extensive properties in the Bruges hinterland 
and oft en provided the representatives of the butchers’ guild in the city 
council. A similar double marriage occurred again in the generation of their 
grandchildren, when Christoff el Metteneye and his sister Agnes Metteneye 
respectively married a brother and sister of the Van Nieuwenhove family , 
who combined long- distance trade with an increasingly frequent participa-
tion in the city council. In sum, the Metteneye family not only accumulated 
a large number of mandates in the city council, but also maintained strong 
ties with other families who were themselves exceptionally infl uential in 
Bruges society. 
 While it is impossible to measure the precise political power wielded by 
such a closely knit network of fathers, sons, brothers- in- law, cousins, friends 
and business partners, it was surely a force to be reckoned with. 102 A quanti-
tative analysis of the surviving lists of aldermen indicates that families such 
as the Metteneye were no rarity and that their political power far exceeded 
their numerical strength. Th e following graph shows the social balance of 
power in the city council: it seems that the Bruges political community was 
structurally shaped by two seemingly contradictory developments, namely 
a relatively low threshold for entrance into the urban political arena, on 
the one hand, and the formation of strong networks within that arena, on 
the other. 
 Put briefl y, there was a strong and structural imbalance in the political 
community of late medieval Bruges, in which during every quarter- century 
period, the top 20 per cent of the families usually claimed around half of 
all available offi  ces of aldermen and councillors. While, as we have seen, 
no information survives on the actual process of decision- making within 
those councils, it is likely that much of it was shaped by an aggregate of 
strongly interrelated ‘political dynasties’, like that of the Metteneye family . 
In this sense, one might say that the structure of the political elite hardly 
 102  For a detailed case study, see J. Haemers, ‘Factionalism and State Power in the Flemish Revolt 
(1482– 1492)’,  Journal of Social History , 42 (2009), 1009– 39. 
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changed between 1351 and 1500, despite all the upheavals and despite the 
political infl uence of the guilds. Th at said, this structural feature of Bruges 
urban politics does not imply that the city was dominated by a fi xed set of 
families, as was the case for example in the city- state of Venice . 103 Th ere 
was always a considerable turnover within the political community in the 
long run, simply because not all families managed to reproduce themselves 
in a biological and social sense. Th e prominence of the Metteneye lineage 
spanned the entire fourteenth and fi ft eenth centuries, but in this they were 
rather exceptional. If the turnover rate within the contemporary Flemish 
nobility is anything to go by (and the Metteneye marriages show that lead-
ing political families were closely tied to that social group), then it is likely 
 103  See A. Cowan,  Manners, Marriage and Mobility in Early Modern Venice (Aldershot, 2007). 
 Table  7.2  Lorenz curve of the distribution of mandates in the Bruges city 
council between 1351 and 1500 (per 25 years) 
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that the Bruges political elite would have lost more than half its members 
per century: other ambitious families were thus constantly given opportu-
nities to take their place. 104 
 Clearly, the revolts that so frequently punctuated Bruges politics only 
temporarily interrupted the political domination of wealthy merchants 
and moneyed landowners. Th e groups who led these revolts mostly orig-
inated in what can be considered ‘the middle class of small commodity 
producers’:  independent guild masters who possessed their own means 
of production and had a comparatively good standard of living. 105 Th eir 
social inferiors, among the artisans who did not possess their own means 
of production, such as the weavers working in subcontracting and full-
ers or the wage workers not organized in guilds, had no political power 
at all. However, clear distinctions between these various social layers are 
oft en diffi  cult to make because they were to some extent interconnected 
through social networks and ties of patronage. Professional links between 
richer guild masters and common artisans must have been legion, as they 
made daily contact, economic partnerships and friendships, but these ties 
are oft en diffi  cult to reconstruct. It is harder to trace in surviving sources 
the marriage networks that existed among these social groups than it is 
for those made between families such as the Metteneyes . Marriages gener-
ated trust between trade partners, created social networks functioning as 
a kind of social security system, and allowed the assimilation of outsiders 
into Bruges society:  foreign merchants, for instance, oft en married local 
tradesmen in Bruges; several descendants from the Adornes , the commer-
cial family originating from Genoa , married important banker and mer-
chant families in the city. 106 Th ough the elite was bound together by this 
kind of ‘trade endogamy’, marriages of elite children with sons and daugh-
ters of middle- class members oft en occurred, which made social mobility 
possible for guild masters. Social networks within the city were many and 
diverse, and to some extent the sharpness of social divisions must have been 
soft ened by an overlap between these networks. 107 
 Th e career of Boudin Petyt in the late fi ft eenth century reveals the con-
nections that could exist between social networks and political power. 
 104  F.  Buylaert , ‘ Th e Late Medieval “Crisis of the Nobility” Reconsidered: Th e Case of Flanders ’, 
 Journal of Social History ,  45 ( 2012 ),  1 – 18 . 
 105  H.  Soly , ‘ Th e Political Economy of European Craft  Guilds: Power Relations and Economic 
Strategies of Merchants and Master Artisans in the Medieval and Early Modern Textile 
Industries ’,  International Review of Social History ,  53 ( 2008 ),  45 – 71 . 
 106  On this family, see Geirnaert and Vandewalle (eds.),  Adornes en Jeruzalem . 
 107  Haemers,  For the Common Good , pp. 174– 5. 
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Boudin did not belong to the urban ‘elite’, but he was a master bonnet maker 
( mutsemaker ). Th e bonnet makers were oft en small entrepreneurs, as 
Bruges was well known for its fashionable confection products, which oft en 
had large markets, so Boudin might have belonged to the more well- to- 
do middle class. Since he was related to the Adornes family , whose family 
archives have survived, much can be retrieved about his social background. 
He was married to Kateline Losschaert , the sister of Jan , a wealthy hosteller 
who belonged to the Bruges political elite. 108 With this marriage, Boudin 
made a remarkable social leap, as Jan Losschaert was married to Adriana 
Despars , the daughter of the international merchant Mark Despars and 
Margriete Metteneye . Boudin’s marriage contract sheds light on the eco-
nomic background of both partners. When Boudin Petyt married Kateline 
in December 1476, the Losschaerts provided her with a dowry of money 
and fi efs in Oostduinkerke , Kaaskerke , Diksmuide and Cadzand (small 
villages in the Liberty of Bruges ). From his mother, Boudin had inherited 
some annuities, houses in Bruges, and money from ‘diverse trading ships’ 
belonging to his father. 109 Boudin himself owned annuities on properties in 
Nieuwpoort and Bruges, where he held property too. 110 Evidently, Boudin 
had accumulated some economic and fi nancial resources in the years pre-
ceding his marriage. Th is made him a more eligible prospect for a marriage 
into a really elite family. Two other powerful members of the commercial 
elite, Jan de Boot and Donaas de Moor , were witnesses at Boudin’s wed-
ding. 111 Boudin’s marriage to Kateline brought grist to his mill in another 
respect, as his wife would turn out to be the principal (but not sole) heir to 
the Losschaert estate. 112 In short, Boudin came from a prosperous upper 
 108  SAB, Adornes, 361; AGR, Chambers of Accounts, 17412, fos. 1 v – 2 r ; and  R.  Opsommer ,  Omme 
dat leengoed es thoochste dinc van der weerelt: Het leenrecht in Vlaanderen in de 14de en 15de 
eeuw ( Brussels ,  1995 ), p.  348 . Th e father of Jan, Antonis, possessed many fi efs, namely in 
Koolkerke, Westkapelle, Cadzand, Sint- Anna- ter- Muiden, Oostkerke, Wenduine, Zuienkerke, 
Leffi  nge, Esen, Loppem and Oostkamp (AGR, Chambers of Accounts 17404, fos. 1 v – 2 v ; and 
SAB, 64, fos. 17 v – 18 r , 40 r , 64 v , 70 v , 89 r– v , 92 r , 93 v , 107 r– v , 115 r , 139 v , 143 r , 198 v , 227 v , 237 v and 
276 v ; compare with SAB, 519, fos. 7 v , 30 r– v , 46 v , 56 r– v , 67 v – 68 r , 70 r – 71 r , 80 r– v , 104 r– v , 110 r , 139 v – 
140 r , 162 r– v , 187 v , 205 r , 223 r ). 
 109  Th e marriage contract gave Boudin Petyt annuities worth 23 pounds Flemish gros, 414 
pounds Flemish gros in cash (129 pounds from ‘diversche coopmanscepen’), four houses in 
the Rechtestraat and land in the Sint- Jansdijk (SAB, Adornes, 361). 
 110  He owned annuities from Nieuwpoort (ADN, B 5392, fo. 27 v ), and several parts of houses in 
the Zouterstraat and Vlamingstraat in Bruges (SAB, 360). 
 111  SAB, Adornes, 361. Th e social background of these people is discussed above. 
 112  Th e other heir was Kateline’s sister Jozijne Losschaert, married to Jacob Boulengier. Upon 
Kateline’s death in 1538, her son Francois f. Boudin Petyt inherited from her three fi efs with a 
combined area of 55.5 measures (24.6 ha) and two additional fi efs in kind. Prior to her death 
she also bequeathed two fi efs to her granddaughters Margriete and Kateline f. Francois Petyt 
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middle- class family, acquired social capital among the urban elite through 
his marriage, and then expanded his property holdings with a lucrative 
marriage contract. His career reads as a story of upward social mobility. 
 And then a sudden opportunity off ered Boudin a unique chance to 
acquire political power. In April 1477, only a few months aft er his mar-
riage, Boudin was elected as councillor during the turbulent period aft er 
the death of Charles the Bold. Th e city government that had been installed 
in April 1477 united representatives of the craft  guilds which had recently 
gained power, and members of the elite faction of Willem Moreel . 113 It 
seems that Boudin was an excellent candidate for this offi  ce because he had 
social and political ties to both power networks in the newly appointed 
magistracy. His brother- in- law Jan Losschaert , who had become burgo-
master , probably supported him as a candidate. It is quite possible that the 
offi  cials of the guild to which Boudin belonged had a decisive voice in his 
election. Perhaps the guild offi  cials thought that Boudin’s connections with 
the leading networks of the urban elite made him useful to them as a can-
didate for city offi  ce; or perhaps (since they also appointed him guild dean 
in September 1478) they considered him politically and intellectually able, 
talents that he certainly needed to fulfi l the task of political offi  ce. 114 Briefl y, 
Boudin was not a common craft sman, but neither did he belong to the 
higher circles of the socio- economic elite of Bruges. He developed social 
ties with the merchant elite through his marriage, which made him a ‘rising 
star’. He might already have aspired to political offi  ce, but it was the revolt 
of 1477 that launched his political career. 
 Th e Lorenz graph confi rms that a large part of the political commu-
nity never achieved a long- term presence in the city government; and that 
access to the system remained relatively open, even if the men who served 
infrequently were liable to become pawns in the games of the more power-
ful or acted primarily as spokesmen for their guild or for another economic 
interest group. Clearly, if the top 20 per cent of the politically active families 
claimed half of the available mandates, the other half was fi lled by a large 
group of men who were not the products of ‘dynasties,’ but individuals rep-
resenting families who rarely provided members to serve in the city magis-
tracy. Th ese individuals, some of whom only served once, made up a broad 
and ever- changing satellite group around a stable core of well- established 
with a combined area of 112 measures (49.6 ha). In 1503, Francois had already inherited a 
fi ef of 34.5 measures (15.3 ha) upon his father’s death. See SAB, 64 (feudal register 1468) and 
SAB, 519. 
 113  Haemers, ‘Factionalism’. 
 114  SAB, 114. 
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families. Th at some ambitious and talented individuals could rise to become 
councillors and aldermen, despite lacking the social connections that were 
so central to dominant families such as the Metteneyes , is undoubtedly a 
consequence of the shift  in power that occurred in the early fourteenth cen-
tury:  the successful bid for power made by the craft  guilds in 1304, and 
the collapse of the monopoly enjoyed by the thirteenth- century oligarchy, 
had allowed many newcomers to enter the magistracy as representatives 
of one of the Nine Members . Th is relative openness of the political arena 
was maintained throughout the Burgundian and Habsburg eras (from 1384 
onwards) – this despite the gradual dismantling of guild political power. 
 One might imagine that the growing infl uence of the princely state would 
have allowed the fi ft eenth- century commercial elite to re- establish the level 
of control over the urban government which the thirteenth- century mer-
chant oligarchy had lost in the early fourteenth century with the rise of the 
craft  guilds. Yet, an analysis of the recruitment base of the urban govern-
ment reveals that the socio- political history of late medieval Bruges was 
more complicated than that, as the following table shows: 
 Initially, in line with the political development outlined above, the late 
fourteenth century did see a trend towards oligarchy, with the temporary 
elimination of the guilds from power. Indeed, the fi rst quarter of the fi ft eenth 
century saw a marked drop in the number of families who populated the 
city magistracy (from 138 families in 1351– 75 to 115 families in 1401– 25). 
Th is observation tallies with the vigorous confl icts between prominent fac-
tions who sought to oust each other from the political arena at the begin-
ning of the fi ft eenth century. Yet, this trend was reversed when the Bruges 
craft smen rebelled against Duke Philip the Good in 1436 in an attempt to 
reclaim their political rights. Although the duke eventually crushed the 
revolt , the repression that followed did not cause the recruitment base of 
 Table  7.3  Number of families providing aldermen and 
councillors to the Bruges magistracy, 1351– 1500 
 Time span  Number of families providing aldermen 
and councillors to the Bruges magistracy 
 1351– 75  138 
 1376– 1400  144 
 1401– 25  115 
 1426– 50  158 
 1451– 75  164 
 1476– 1500  237 
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the city council to shrink. Both the revolt and its repression included purges 
of the city council, so that no fewer than 158 families provided a magistrate 
in 1426– 50. Yet this fi gure was even higher for the period 1451– 75 (164 
families), which was not subject to such drastic upheavals. Th us, the num-
ber of families that provided one or more members of the city government 
essentially remained stable and even climbed higher during the new urban 
uprisings and repressions of the late fi ft eenth century, when control over the 
social composition of the city council shift ed to and fro between princely 
factions and the craft  guilds. Th ese fi gures contradict the hypothesis that a 
closed oligarchy was restored in the fi ft eenth century. When resuming con-
trol aft er a rebellion , the prince and his representatives must have felt some 
pressure to establish a stable urban government, and thus to encourage 
the recruitment to it of individuals and families who had not been tainted 
by previous ideological association with craft  guilds or with partisans of 
the prince. Of course, it is quite likely that in the wake of repressions, new 
aldermen from higher socio- economic strata than before were put in place, 
yet this did not necessarily imply a complete closure of the political arena. 
 Hence, the Lorenz curve showing distribution of political offi  ce among 
families sets up yet another problem: the image of structural stability that it 
presents seems to contradict the recurrent phenomenon of intense political 
crisis. Aft er all, the distribution of mandates over the participating number 
of families was as unequal at the end of the fi ft eenth century as it had been 
in the middle of the fourteenth. Th e underlying reason seems to be that 
the presence of powerful family networks could be found both among the 
 poorterie and the craft  guilds. It was not the case that the cluster of ‘politi-
cal dynasties’ who claimed about half the available seats in the city council 
was strictly recruited from the  poorterie whereas the craft  guilds furnished 
the hundreds of isolated individuals who appear as an alderman or a coun-
cillor without ever constituting a durable political network. So, whichever 
political ideology held sway at a given moment – either the ideal of a corpo-
rately structured commune or that of a city entwined with the burgeoning 
princely state – there were always strong networks of intermarried families 
who had a long- standing tradition of having representatives in the college 
of aldermen. 
 Various developments contributed to this phenomenon. Firstly, the 
ranks of guilds were themselves to some degree joined by leading fami-
lies of the  poorterie : these sometimes purchased guild membership, even if 
they had little to do with the guild’s economic activity. Some of those fam-
ilies took up leading positions in the guild’s government and represented 
the guild in the city government. Secondly, as we have seen, many of these 
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guilds were not egalitarian institutions, but had their own internal hierar-
chies. In 1477 the demand that the aldermen should be elected from each 
Member of the city, showed that the principle of fi xed guild representation 
had long been abandoned. 115 Since at least the end of the fourteenth cen-
tury it had become the case that only some representatives from the richer 
guilds – such as the butchers , fi shmongers and luxury trades, or those of the 
weavers or stone masons who were actually big entrepreneurs – managed to 
become aldermen. In any case, membership of the butchers and fi shmon-
gers had eff ectively become hereditary at the turn of the fi ft eenth century, 
and they were dominated by status- conscious families whose power, social 
networks and sense of lineage were equal to those of the leading families of 
the  poorterie . 116 
 Within some other craft s there was also a pronounced trend towards 
oligarchy during the fi ft eenth century. Guild membership was kept scru-
pulously accessible to newcomers, but the guild dean , members of its gov-
ernment and representatives in the city council were increasingly recruited 
from a cluster of prominent families who usually enjoyed a privileged posi-
tion within the guild economy. Th e well- documented case of the construc-
tion guilds provides a telling example: the politically active guild masters 
were also the richest members of the guild and they seem to have used their 
infl uence in the city council to exert a monopoly over contracts for public 
construction works in the city. A  similar polarization was present in the 
textile craft s, where a large number of relatively poor guild masters seem 
to have worked as subcontractors for wealthy drapers who controlled the 
capital necessary for the production process. 117 During the fi ft eenth cen-
tury, the powerful dean of the weavers’ guild and their representative in 
urban government was always an important draper. 118 Th e leading families 
in these guilds did not monopolize the guild government or the guild’s rep-
resentation in the city council completely; nor could they ignore their rank 
and fi le during guild assemblies; but their dominating presence in craft  
guilds shows that they contributed to the exclusive network of families that 
claimed so many seats in the city magistracy. 
 A sense of social hierarchy penetrated even the most communal occa-
sions of guild activity. Th e seating arrangements at the annual banquet of 
 115  Haemers,  For the Common Good , pp. 159– 60. 
 116  Dumolyn,  De Brugse opstand , pp. 85– 7, 355. 
 117  Sosson, ‘La structure sociale’, pp. 472– 6; Sosson,  Les travaux publics , passim; Stabel, ‘Entre 
commerce’; Stabel, ‘Guilds in Late Medieval Flanders’, p. 209; and J. Brys, ‘Sociale gelaagdheid 
binnen het laatmiddeleeuwse Brugse weversambacht: Een prosopografi sche studie’, 2 vols., 
unpublished MA thesis, Ghent University (Ghent, 2009). 
 118  Vermaut, ‘De textielnijverheid’, vol.  ii , p. 340. 
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the shooting confraternity of St Sebastian (one with broad social appeal, 
bringing together members of many craft  guilds, and well attended by the 
majority of members), were carefully calibrated to highlight gradations of 
status within the confraternity:  the table of honour was presided over by 
prominent urban politicians, some of whom belonged to the craft  guilds; 
the second table was reserved for prominent craft smen and younger mem-
bers of established political dynasties; all the other guild members were rel-
egated to three other  tables – where they seem to have been served beer 
instead of wine. 119 In these kinds of festive occasion, the leading members 
of craft  guilds manifested their social aspirations. Indeed, they and their 
families oft en married into the political dynasties of the  poorterie whose 
wealth was probably based not on craft  activity but on a mix of commerce, 
rents and landownership. Little wonder, then, that angry craft smen oft en 
targeted their own representatives in the city council when they rebelled to 
restore, in eff ect, the ideal of corporate equality. 120 
 Th ese refl ections help clarify the nature of the Bruges ‘elite’. It is clear 
that the  poorterie itself did not form a coherent ‘patriciate’ of elite families; 
and that many powerful families of the Bruges magistracy came from the 
craft  guilds. Less clear is whether the aggregate of the powerful families 
from both craft  guilds and  poorterie can be categorized as a coherent urban 
‘patriciate’. Th e balance of evidence suggests not. Th ere obviously existed 
powerful and thoroughly intermarried families of which middling and 
lower groups in Bruges society were acutely aware: the frequency of urban 
revolts shows that craft smen were highly sensitive to the dangers presented 
by political oligarchies to which their own guild leaders oft en belonged. 
Yet it is not self- evident that these political oligarchies constituted coherent 
social groups. Th e frequent intermarriages between the mighty dynasties of 
the  poorterie and the craft  guilds (such as the Metteneyes and the Breydels ), 
may well have appeared to members of lower social strata to be the alliances 
of a single social group bent on consolidating their exclusive political power, 
but it does not follow that those dynasties would have shared that view. 
First, although there was certainly a strong tendency for politically active 
families to intermarry, political offi  ce was not in itself their sole concern. 
Although the majority of Metteneye marriage partners came from families 
with representatives in the city council, and while all of them belonged to 
the top layers of the socio- economic hierarchy, some of them had little to do 
 119  L.  Crombie , ‘ Honour, Community and Hierarchy in the Feasts of the Archery and Crossbow 
Guilds of Bruges, 1445– 81 ’,  JMH ,  30 ( 2011 ),  102– 13 . 
 120  Dumolyn,  De Brugse opstand , pp. 75– 6, 115. 
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with urban politics. Secondly, and more importantly, the aggregate of fam-
ilies that historians so readily term a ‘patriciate’ or the ‘urban political elite’ 
was not closed at the top. Th e aspirational sights of most prominent families 
in late medieval Bruges were trained less on a seat in urban government 
than on a place within the Flemish nobility. Th e marriages of the Metteneye 
family into noble lineages were replicated by many similar families. 
 Intermarriage between nobles and citizens had long taken place. In the 
wake of the increasing urbanization of the county from the high Middle 
Ages onwards, a growing number of noble lineages had established them-
selves in the large cities and opened up their ranks for marriage to those 
citizens who were particularly notable. From the mid fourteenth century 
onwards, this growing proximity to nobles enabled some of those citizens 
to acquire the hallmarks of nobility for themselves, namely the ownership 
of a lordship or a knightly title. By 1500, at least twenty- three lineages of 
Bruges citizens had been ennobled . Th e Metteneye family can serve once 
more as an example: one Jan Metteneye appears in the sources as a knight 
in the 1380s, and in the fi ft eenth century the family held the lordship of 
Marke (a village near Kortrijk ). Th e end result was a growing noble pres-
ence in Bruges: whereas in the mid fourteenth century, there had only been 
six noble lineages established in the city, by the mid fi ft eenth there were 
at least thirty. Th us, the world of politically active individuals in Bruges 
did not constitute a self- contained  social category. Th e widespread desire 
among leading families in Bruges to join the Flemish nobility superseded 
any desire to enter and dominate the city council: for many of them munic-
ipal offi  ce was only one constituent of the family’s power and prestige, 
behind more important social markers such as the acquisition of seigniorial 
lordship or service to the prince. 121 
 Th ere were pressures on the Flemish nobility as well as gradations within it. 
In Bruges, men such as Roeland van Uutkerke and Lodewijk van Gruuthuse 
stood out from the rest of the nobility within towns because of the sheer 
extent of their prestige and riches, and the sheer number of their offi  ces and 
courtly positions. 122 Th ey represented a pinnacle towards which other noble 
families aspired to climb. Lineages such as the Metteneyes felt the pressures 
exerted by a strengthening ambition to acquire noble lordship. Th e branch 
of the Metteneye lineage that held the lordship of Marke  – and thus with 
 121  Buylaert, ‘La “noblesse urbaine” ’. 
 122  M.  Boone , ‘ Une famille au service de l’État bourguignon naissant: Roland et Jean d’Uutkerke, 
nobles fl amands dans l’entourage de Philippe le Bon ’,  RN ,  77 ( 1995 ),  233– 55 ;  M. P. J. 
 Martens (ed.),  Lodewijk van Gruuthuse: Mecenas en Europees diplomaat (ca. 1427– 1492) 
( Bruges ,  1992 ). 
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a stronger claim to noble status than the other branch – was increasingly 
inclined to marry into other noble families; and so in the fi ft eenth century 
they gradually developed a social perspective that was somewhat diff erent 
from that of the lower- ranking family branch, and from that of many other 
families in Bruges who were otherwise their equal in terms of wealth and 
clout in urban politics. In other words, a process of social diff erentiation 
is evident within what had formerly been a cohesive milieu within Bruges 
society. 
 Th is trend seems to have been reinforced by the unusually frequent pres-
ence of Duke Philip the Good’s court in Bruges between 1440 and 1467. 
Th e more prolonged residence of noblemen associated with the court had 
an eff ect on the social character of the city that is visible in one of Bruges’ 
most prominent social occasions. Since the fourteenth century, the city had 
had its own jousting confraternity, known probably from the 1370s as the 
society of the White Bear , which had its own annual event; and the avail-
able evidence suggests that this exclusive society became even more elit-
ist. In the 1420s and 1430s, this club was completely dominated by scions 
of local families of great power and wealth, of which roughly 20 per cent 
had become ennobled. From the 1440s onwards, the number of individuals 
allowed to participate in the jousts declined, largely at the expense of those 
with commoner status, while a growing number of high- born nobles from 
the ducal entourage now started to participate in their stead. Th e confra-
ternity seems to have become the club of an increasingly small and socially 
conscious clique that distinguished itself from its urban peers by basking in 
the social glow produced by intensifi ed interactions with the high nobility. 
 Th e quest for pre- eminence within noble society had another geograph-
ical dimension:  pressures within Bruges society had implications for the 
Liberty of Bruges . Th e world view of their respective elites was not bounded 
by the city’s walls. Th e upper groups of city and countryside, while possess-
ing their own distinctive characteristics, were all part of the same hetero-
geneous top layer of late medieval society; ‘boundaries’ between the Bruges 
merchant elite and the local nobles in the countryside had always been 
porous. From the twelft h century onwards, the gap between the nobility and 
other groups in the top social layer (such as burghers and large landowners 
who lacked noble status) narrowed. As we have seen, during the thirteenth 
century the merchant class reached a certain  modus vivendi with important 
noble families in the vicinity, such as the lords of Assebroek , the lords of 
Gistel and of Praet : the city gradually bought up their toll rights and landed 
property. Not all local lords were compliant: the lord of Sijsele ‘had always 
been an enemy of the city’, according to the  Annales Gandenses . Aft er the 
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victory of the Flemish army at the Battle of Kortrijk  – largely made up of 
the Bruges and Ypres militias but also with a strong contingent of peasants 
of the Liberty of Bruges  – Bruges seized all his territories in the immediate 
vicinity of the city. 123 In most cases, however, the relations between the elites 
of Bruges and the Liberty, and between the nobility and the burghers, had 
not been so tense. From the thirteenth century onwards they were drawn 
closer by the eff ects of two complementary processes: the growing tendency 
of nobles to gravitate towards the cities, and of burghers to buy property in 
the countryside. Both of these were closely tied up with the renewal of late 
medieval elites and interrelated trends in social mobility. 124 
 While landownership remained a staple of nobility throughout the ancien 
régime , from the fourteenth century onwards new nobles frequently hailed 
from social groups with a basis very diff erent from rural landownership. In 
turn, most nobles became less dependent on seigniorial revenues. Th e trend 
towards greater social diff erentiation and mobility within the ranks of the 
nobility and burghers was intensifi ed by the arrival of the Valois Burgundian 
dynasty in Flanders and the integration of the county into a burgeoning state 
apparatus: princely service opened up more career opportunities to noble-
men, burghers and aspiring commoners alike. By the end of the fi ft eenth 
century some 25 per cent of the noble families in Bruges and its environs 
were from the ranks of the urban elite. We must be wary of picturing this too 
readily in terms of a social melting pot, though. Th ose groups as a whole did 
not completely lose their distinctive characteristics. Burghers who invested 
in extensive rural properties did not necessarily abandon their business 
interests; the purchase of fi efs could be driven by a desire for social recog-
nition but also by a hard- nosed decision to diversify assets. A  noble life-
style and commercial enterprise were not necessarily incompatible pursuits. 
Overall, while there was considerable interaction between elements of rural 
and urban elites, the exchange between them was not reciprocated equally. 
As the nobility remained the class with the highest social prestige, the upper 
part of burgher society was more strongly drawn to the nobility than vice 
versa. As such, this rapprochement between burghers and nobility did not 
result in the creation of a group that can be labelled an ‘urban nobility’: to 
suggest that the nobility in general became virtually indistinguishable from 
the upper groups of Bruges citizens would be to stretch a point too far. 125 
 123  Johnstone (ed.),  Annals of Ghent , pp. 8, 14. 
 124  Buylaert, ‘Late Medieval Crisis’;  F.  Buylaert and  A.  Ramandt , ‘ Th e Transformation of Rural 
Elites in Late Medieval Flanders: Oligarchy, State Formation and Social Change in the Liberty 
of Bruges (ca. 1350 – ca. 1525) ’,  Continuity and Change ,  30 ( 2015 ),  36 – 69 . 
 125  Buylaert, ‘La “noblesse urbaine” ’. 
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 Moreover, towards the end of the Middle Ages some of the most promi-
nent families of Bruges were increasingly inclined to expand their social 
horizons beyond the city and its direct hinterland. In the fourteenth cen-
tury, Bruges had still been more or less a political entity that was contained 
within a political framework involving relations with the count of Flanders 
and the two other urban giants, Ghent and Ypres . During the later Middle 
Ages, the county of Flanders was fi rst incorporated into the political union 
of the Burgundian Low Countries, and subsequently into that of the vast 
Habsburg empire . Th is development opened up new vistas of opportunity 
for local elites. Consider the Metteneye family again: in the mid fourteenth 
century its activities were limited to Bruges and its environs, but in the early 
sixteenth century, the family extended its marriage ties out to noble lin-
eages from Hainaut , Walloon Flanders and other more distant regions. Jan 
Metteneye , lord of Marke , spent several years in Spain as a chamberlain of 
Emperor Charles V. Th e Metteneye lineage did remain committed to the 
world of Bruges politics, but this was not the case for all families. Consider 
the example of the Braderic family , which had combined interests in high 
fi nance with a long- standing participation in the city council. Th is family 
also became noble in the fourteenth century, and came to possess a grow-
ing number of properties in eastern Flanders as a consequence of marriages 
with lineages from the environs of Ghent and Malines (such as the families 
Vilain , Van Massemen and Van Voorhoute ). In the second half of the fi f-
teenth century, the family lost interest in Bruges politics in favour of other 
arenas and never again provided an alderman or a councillor aft er 1447. 
 Perhaps for most families the spires of the Bruges Belfry and the city 
churches continued to remain the dominant landmarks on their mental 
landscape; but for some the pursuit of power and prestige made them peer 
beyond the local horizon, and thus lose touch with the upper echelons of 
Bruges society. 
 So to what extent was position within the social hierarchy of late medie-
val Bruges determined by position in the political  cursus honorum of urban 
government? Th e answer to this question must be nuanced. Political power 
undoubtedly bestowed social status on its holder: access to the decision- 
making arenas of both the urban magistracy and of guild government was 
restricted and thus exclusive. Only a small part of the male urban popu-
lation was ever actively involved in policy- making, and those who were 
must have acquired considerable social standing within the urban commu-
nity. Beyond that, however, there is little reason to assume that the aggre-
gate of politically active individuals and families ever corresponded to a 
relatively stable and coherent social group. Oligarchies were able to form 
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and reform despite the political revolt of the early 1300s, but the city and 
guild governments were never dominated exclusively by cliques of pow-
erful families. Such cliques did exist, and the political ‘dynasties’ that con-
stituted them, especially the hosteller families who profi ted from Bruges 
international commerce, could have a disproportionately loud voice in the 
Bruges polity, but they always co- existed with a relatively broad and unsta-
ble assemblage of individuals whose calling to politics was more muted and 
perhaps more personal in nature. Th e total number of families who pro-
vided offi  ce- holders gradually grew, especially because repeated urban ris-
ings continued to bring about regime changes in the city magistracy. Th us, 
members of the ‘urban political elite’ became an increasingly heterogeneous 
group in the later Middle Ages: some remained commoners, others became 
noble, while still others, the most prominent of families, turned their gaze 
to opportunities far beyond the city walls. Whereas in 1300 the marriage 
networks and social aspirations of Bruges’ most august families had been 
geared principally around the city’s government and politics, by 1500 this 
was no longer the case. 
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